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Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation
Principles: Saving Billions of Dollars for
Refinancing Homeowners
∗

∗∗

Grant S. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman
I. INTRODUCTION

In eras of declining interest rates, millions of residential
mortgage loans may be refinanced. When this occurs, it is customary
for the refinancing lender to require a title examination and a new
mortgagee’s title insurance policy. This requirement is expensive,
usually costing several hundred dollars or more, and the cost is
invariably paid by the borrower. This Article proposes that in the vast
majority of refinancings this expense can be substantially reduced or
even eliminated. This result can be achieved through proper
understanding, adoption, and use of the doctrine of equitable
mortgage subrogation articulated in the Restatement (Third) of
Property: Mortgages.1 The principle of subrogation comes into play
when the proceeds of a new mortgage are used to pay off a
preexisting mortgage; it allows the holder of a new mortgage to take
the priority of the old mortgage.2 If subrogation is made available
liberally, as the Restatement recommends, it can eliminate the risk
that intervening liens, arising between the dates of the original and
the refinancing mortgages, will take priority over the refinancing

∗ Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. Professor Nelson expresses
his appreciation to Benjamin F. Gardner and Phillip Lerch for their excellent research
assistance.
∗∗ James E. Campbell Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of MissouriColumbia.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §§ 7.3, 7.6 (1997).
2. Priority is critical to mortgage lenders because, in the event of foreclosure, liens
having higher priority are paid first out of the foreclosure proceeds. Hence, if an intervening
lien, such as a judgment, a mechanic’s lien, or the like, acquires priority over the refinancing
mortgage, the risk is increased that the foreclosure proceeds will be insufficient to pay the
mortgage in full. See 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 1.1 (4th ed. 2001).
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mortgage. Hence, the need for new title insurance protection can be
largely or entirely avoided.
Part II of this Article3 describes the most recent wave of
refinancings and estimates the costs involved in providing
mortgagee’s title insurance. Part III4 focuses on traditional
subrogation and related principles as they operate in the mortgage
refinancing context and shows how the Restatement approach
greatly reduces the risk of loss of mortgage priority for mortgage
lenders. Part IV5 describes and advocates two simple changes to
current residential mortgage documents that would greatly enhance
their usefulness in the context of subrogation. Part V6 discusses the
value that title insurance adds to a refinancing lender’s rights and
considers whether, under a modern concept of mortgage
subrogation, lenders might elect to forego their current requirement
that title insurance be issued. Part VI7 describes how direct
assignment of refinanced mortgages could serve as an alternative to
subrogation and evaluates whether such a change in present practice
is feasible. Part VII8 examines conditions in the mortgage and title
insurance markets and argues that the pervasive adoption of the
subrogation principle should either reduce title insurance premiums
substantially in refinancings or, alternatively, cause major mortgage
lenders to eliminate the need for title insurance completely. Finally,
Part VIII9 considers whether state judicial adoption of the
Restatement’s mortgage subrogation principles is the best course of
action or whether Congress should enact the Restatement approach
by legislation; we advocate the latter. Part IX offers a brief
conclusion.
II. THE COSTS OF REFINANCING
Beginning in April 2002, the United States experienced an
astonishing decline in residential mortgage interest rates. The thirtyyear fixed-rate mortgage, usually considered the standard or bell-

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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weather of the industry, had been near 7%10 since the beginning of
2001.11 But in April 2002, it began a remarkable plunge,12 reaching
a low of 5.21% in June 2003. It has remained near or below 6% to
the present.13 Adjustable rate mortgages,14 which nearly always carry
rates lower than fixed-rate loans, experienced a similar decline, falling
to 4.5% in mid-2002 and ultimately reaching a low of 3.36% in
March 2004; they remain just above 5% at this writing.15
Some perspective on the extraordinary nature of these rate
reductions is gained by considering the historic data on average new
home mortgage yields published in the annual Economic Report of
the President. Since the commencement of that data series in 1963,
the lowest reported yield prior to 2000 was 5.81% in 1965—more
than one-half of a percentage point higher than the June 2003 low.16
10. Data are based on the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS). See
http://www.freddiemac.com/dlink/html/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp?year=2006
(last visited Feb. 22, 2006). The data are also available at Mortgage-X.com, National Average
Mortgage Rates: Historical Data, http://mortgage-x.com/general/historical_rates.asp (last
visited Feb. 22, 2006). Currently, 125 lenders across the nation—thrifts, commercial banks,
and mortgage lending companies—are surveyed each week. Id. Rates given are for
conventional financing on conforming mortgages with loan-to-value (LTV) rates of eighty
percent or less. Id. The effect of points and fees charged by lenders is not included. The data
are available from 1992 onward on a continuously-updated basis. Id.
“Conforming” loans are those eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Id.
The upper limit of conforming loans is adjusted annually by these two government-sponsored
enterprises. For example, in 2000, the limit for single-family homes was $252,700. By 2005, it
had been increased to $359,650. Id.
11. The 7% level was considered relatively low, but not unusual. Rates had fallen to the
7% range in late 1993, in February 1996, and through the period from the beginning of 1998
through mid-1999. Id.
12. The reduction in rates was primarily a product of the actions of the Federal Open
Market Committee, an entity of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which
controls U.S. monetary policy. Rates were reduced to stimulate the economy in the face of a
recession that occurred in 2001. See James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, How Did Leading
Indicator Forecasts Perform During the 2001 Recession?, 89 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND
ECON. Q. 71 (2003); Milton Marquis, Setting the Interest Rate, FRBSF ECON. LETTER 2002–
30, Oct. 11, 2002.
13. As of Feb. 16, 2006, the rate was 6.28%; this was the highest level it had reached
since a brief peak of 6.29% in June 2004. See http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/
pmms30.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
14. The data reflect one-year adjustable rate mortgages indexed to constant maturity
U.S. Treasury debt with a one-year maturity.
15. As of February 16, 2006, the rate was 5.17%, the highest it had been since January
2002. See http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmmsarm.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
16. 2004 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT, at tbl.B-73, http://frwebgate2.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=8527428750+3+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve. Because of
variations in methods of data collection and computation over time, and because the historical

307

1NELSON.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/5/2006 11:48 AM

[2006

The inevitable result of these drastically lowered interest rates
was a wave of residential mortgage refinancings that far eclipsed in
number those of any previous period. Refinancing volume began
accelerating in early 2001 and reached a sustained peak during April
though June of 2003.17 Refinancings represented 55% of all one-tofour-family mortgage loans in 2001, 59% in 2002, and 66% in
2003.18
The dollar amount of mortgage originations resulting from
refinancing was also exceptional. During the three-year period from
2001 through 2004, refinancing loans totaling about $5.4 trillion
were originated.19 Given an average refinanced mortgage amount of
$130,000,20 about 41 million home mortgage refinancings were
originated during that period. If no households had refinanced more
than once during 2001 through 2003, this figure would represent
ninety-two percent of all homeowners with regular or home-equity
mortgages.21 These figures indicate the massive size and volume of
the recent refinancing activity.22
This Article argues that the doctrine of subrogation, properly
understood and applied, has the potential to eliminate or greatly
reduce the expense of proof of title to mortgage lenders in
refinancing transactions. If title expense had been lower, it is likely
data in the Economic Report of the President are yields (incorporating the effect of points and
fees) rather than promissory note rates, the historical data are not strictly comparable with the
current Freddie Mac PMMS data.
17. The peak is graphically illustrated in John Robbins, Douglas G. Duncan & Jay
Brinkman, Economic/Housing Outlook, Powerpoint Presentation given at 91st Annual MBA
Convention, at 18 (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/
presentations/91st_annual/ConventionEconForecast10-27-04-Finalized.pdf.
18. See
Mortgage
Bankers
Ass’n,
1-to-4-Family
Originations,
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/marketdata/data/03/1-4_originations.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2006).
19. See U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, An Analysis of Mortgage
Refinancing 2001–2003, Nov. 2004, at 2, http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/
MortgageRefinance03.pdf.
20. The average amount refinanced during 2001 and early 2002 was $128,800. We
have adjusted the figure upward slightly to approximate inflation during 2002–03. See Glenn
B. Canner et al., Mortgage Refinancing in 2001 and Early 2002, FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 2002,
at 470 tbl.1, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2002/1202lead.pdf.
21. See Insurance Information Institute, Mortgage Finance and Housing, Financial
Services Fact Book 2006, http://www.financialservicesfacts.org/financial2/mortgage/
mortgages/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) (indicating that in 2003, there were
45,471,000 households that had regular or home-equity mortgages).
22. Because there were multiple refinancings by some households, these numbers
overstate somewhat the number of households that refinanced.
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that even more refinancings would have occurred during 2001–
2004, and refinancing would have been even more efficient and
advantageous to those who did refinance. Hence, the estimation of
size of the title expense is extremely useful. Undertaking such an
estimation, however, is no easy task. Mortgage lenders almost always
require a new title insurance policy, which the borrower pays before
the borrower may refinance an existing loan.23 However, no national
uniformity in title insurance methods or rates is currently in place. In
many areas of the nation, title insurance is written by agents24 who
also perform the necessary search of the records and charge an allinclusive rate. In other areas, attorneys or local companies act as title
insurance agents and make a separate charge for their services in
examining the records. Rates tend to be similar among title
companies in a given locality but vary widely throughout the nation.
There is no national database of title insurance rates.
The issue is further complicated by many title companies’ use of
reissue rates. A reissue rate is a discounted rate that is made available
if the same title company has previously issued a policy on the same
property during a fixed time period, usually five or ten years. The
discount may reduce the insurance premium forty to sixty percent of
the standard rate.25 Title underwriters’ approaches to the concept of
the reissue rate vary widely, and consumers are sometimes unaware
that such reissue rates are even available. Therefore, consumers often
do not receive the benefit of reissue rates.26
Despite these variations, it is possible to make a reasonable
estimate of the title insurance cost for a new loan policy issued in
connection with a residential mortgage refinancing. Where an all23. Charles Kovaleski, Should You Refinance?, ALTA, http://www.alta.org/consumer/
refinance.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) (“When you refinance your home, you are in effect
taking out a new loan. Your lender is going to require that you purchase lender’s title
insurance to protect their investment.”); see also Fannie Mae, Refinancing: Requirements &
Costs,
http://www.fanniemae.com/homebuyers/findamortgage/refinancing/requirements
.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
24. The agent represents the underwriter, which is actually the entity that issues the
insurance policy.
25. See Kenneth R. Harney, It’s Homeowners vs. Title Insurers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2001, available at http://www.radianexpress.com/RadianExpress/pdf/radian_lien_la_times.pdf;
Kenneth R. Harney, Refinancing’s Magic Words: Reissue Rate, WASH. POST, June 8, 2002, at
H01.
26. See Kenneth R. Harney, Title Insurance "Reissue Rates" Spark Class Action Suits,
Controversy, REALTY TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/
20030414_reissuerates.htm.
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inclusive rate is available, our estimate of the cost for an average
$130,000 refinancing is approximately $400.27 Given the roughly 41
million residential refinancings during 2001–2003, the amount spent
on title services protecting refinancing lenders was approximately an
astounding $16 billion. This sum was, from the viewpoint of
consumers, a deadweight loss because consumers have no
independent need or desire for a new title insurance policy when
refinancing. The expenditure is merely a costly condition of
obtaining the new loan. Even from the lender’s viewpoint, the

27. One national title insurance underwriter, First American Title Ins. Co., provides an
Internet calculator that can be used to determine premium rates. See Firstam.com,
http://titlefees.firstam.com/Titlefees.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). The following rates were
calculated from that web site on the basis of a loan of $130,000 refinancing a previous loan
made five years earlier, and having a current balance of $130,000 to eliminate taking cash from
the refinancing. The calculator examines reissue discounts where available.
All-inclusive rate states (sample):
Arizona (Maricopa County) .................................................................................. $541
California (Los Angeles County) ........................................................................... $360
Illinois ................................................................................................................. $330
Michigan (Wayne County).................................................................................... $337
New York (Westchester County)........................................................................... $382
Nevada (Clark County)......................................................................................... $279
Oregon ................................................................................................................ $689
Utah .................................................................................................................... $471
Washington (King County)................................................................................... $313
Average of the foregoing ...................................................................................... $411
States in which a search fee is separately charged:
Florida ................................................................................................................. $362
Massachussetts ..................................................................................................... $195
Minnesota............................................................................................................ $161
Missouri............................................................................................................... $166
Ohio .................................................................................................................... $364
Average of the foregoing ...................................................................................... $250
The average rate of the “separate search fee” states has little meaning because there is no basis
for determining the additional search fee. However, it seems to be at least $150 on average.
The estimate in the text is borne out by LendingTree.com, an Internet mortgage loan
service, whose web site gives an overall national estimate of $450 to $600. See Lending Tree,
Costs of Refinancing, http://www.lendingtree.com/stmrc/refiarticle5.asp?bp= (last visited
Jan. 28, 2006); Pete Boisseau, Radian Continues To Spread Incorrect Cost-Savings, 81 TITLE
NEWS, Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 9 (criticizing the lien-impairment guaranty offered by Radian
Group, Inc. as an alternative to title insurance). The author notes that, “[o]n a $100,000 loan,
true title insurance would cost less than Radian’s $325 flat rate in 36 states. On a $150,000
loan, title insurance would be less expensive in 28 states.” Id.
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expenditure was largely unnecessary and a significant drag on the
economic benefit refinancing generated.
This analysis suggests that title assurance costs for refinancing
residential mortgages are very significant. Of course, residential
mortgages are only part of the story—loans on commercial,
industrial, and agricultural property are also refinanced as interest
rates fall. While restrictions and fees on prepayment impede
refinancing such loans to a much greater extent than with respect to
residential loans,28 nonresidential refinancings are still quite
common. These loans are typically much larger than residential loans
and are thus tied to correspondingly higher title assurance costs.
Title assurance costs act as an impediment to refinancings. In
some cases, they impede enough to cause a mortgagor to forego
refinancing altogether in the hope that a further reduction in interest
rates will make the transaction more worthwhile in the future. In
other cases, the refinancing transaction may still go forward, but the
economic benefit to the mortgagor is lessened by the title assurance
expense. In general, the cost of title assurance, like all transaction
costs, makes the overall transaction less efficient.29
The question we address here is simple: is there a feasible way to
reduce the cost of title assurance in mortgage refinancings? We
believe that the answer is yes, and suggest a simple change in the
law—a change that would harm no one and that is already in effect
in a few states—that would drastically reduce the cost of assuring
refinancing lenders they are receiving mortgages with the priority
they expect and desire. This change involves the doctrine of
mortgage subrogation and its related principles.
III. APPLYING SUBROGATION PRINCIPLES TO
MORTGAGE REFINANCINGS
A mortgagor who seeks to refinance may obtain the new loan
either from the same lender that made the existing loan or from a
different lender altogether. This choice is important for our purposes
28. See Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage Prepayment Clauses: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 40 UCLA L. REV. 851, 851–52 (1993); Joe Mattey, Mortgage Interest Rates,
Valuation, and Prepayment Risk, FRBSF ECON. LETTER 98–30, Oct. 9, 1998, available at
http://www.sf.frb.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr98/el98-30.html (noting that the vast
majority of residential mortgages are freely prepayable).
29. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), http://people.bu.edu/vaguirre/
courses/bu332/nature_firm.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
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because traditional subrogation doctrine applies when using a
different lender. Different principles, albeit “subrogation-like,”
would govern in the former situation.30 Because refinancing by a new
lender is more frequent31 and is governed by pure subrogation rules,
we focus first on such a transaction.
A. Refinancing by a New Lender
The concept of subrogation in mortgage law is simple: “One
who fully performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage,
becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the
mortgage to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”32
Thus, subrogation amounts to an assignment, by operation of law, of
the obligation and the mortgage to the subrogee. To see how this
concept can be applied to a refinancing, assume a homeownermortgagor currently has a fixed rate mortgage loan on her house
with a $200,000 balance that is held by a bank. Because market
interest rates have declined since the loan was obtained, the owner
decides to refinance the balance with a different bank. The typical
mechanics of such a transaction include the following: The
mortgagor will execute a new promissory note and mortgage in favor
of the new bank, and the proceeds of the new loan will be used to
pay off the balance at the old bank. The old bank will then cancel the
mortgagor’s original note and record a discharge of the mortgage.
The new bank’s mortgage will be recorded concurrently and the new
bank will receive a title insurance policy insuring that it has a senior
mortgage on the property. The homeowner-mortgagor will pay the
title insurance premium.
The title insurer’s primary task in this transaction is to insure that
no intervening liens or other interests in the property have been
created since the original mortgage was recorded because such
interests might acquire priority over the new mortgage.33 The

30. See discussion infra Part III.C.
31. See
Michael
D.
Larson,
Refinancing:
New
Rate,
New
Rules,
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/loan/20010106a.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(a) (1997).
33. For example, you may have taken out a second mortgage on the home that could
threaten the priority of the new lender’s mortgage. Or, there could be legal judgments against
you or a mechanic’s lien against the property by a supplier who was not paid for home
improvements. Chi. Title Ins. Co., Why Title Insurance Is Needed when Refinancing a
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doctrine of subrogation can be used to reduce or eliminate the title
insurance company’s risk in this transaction.
For our purposes, the branch of subrogation theory that is of
interest involves one who pays off the debt of another because the
person making the payment is requested by the debtor to do so.34
This is precisely what happens in the typical mortgage refinancing—
the mortgagor requests the refinancing lender, the second bank—to
pay off the prior mortgage loan, which is commonly a first mortgage.
In conventional thinking, this discharges the prior mortgage, leaving
the refinancing lender’s mortgage as the new first mortgage. Of
course, this result is assumed to follow only if no intervening liens or
other interests in the land exist in priority between the old and new
mortgages. If intervening interests do exist, the refinancing lender is
concerned that if the prior mortgage is paid, these interests will be
promoted in priority and will trump the refinancing mortgage. As a
means of self protection, the refinancing lender orders a title
examination and a new title insurance policy, at the expense of the
borrower, to ensure that no such intervening interests exist. If the
old mortgage can be assigned by operation of law to the refinancing
lender, intervening liens or other interests become far less
threatening for the refinancing lender, if not completely irrelevant.35
In such a scenario, those liens will remain subordinate to the
refinanced mortgage because the refinancing mortgagee will
“inherit” the priority of the mortgage being paid off. Hence a
refinancing lender who could be assured of the benefits of
subrogation would put pressure on title insurance companies to
reduce their premium rates or even eliminate the title insurance

Mortgage Loan?, http://www.titleinsuranceny.com/brochure/cons_info_4419.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2006).
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) (1997).
35. Junior liens, despite their lack of priority, do present some disadvantages to senior
mortgagees. See Joshua Stein, Subordinate Mortgage Financing: The Perils of the Senior Lender,
REAL EST. REV., Fall 1997, http://www.real-estate-law.com/articles/subordinate_mortgage
.htm. These disadvantages are relatively minor, particularly in the context of residential
financing, and would not likely cause the refinancing lender to refuse to fund the loan. The
chief disadvantage is that a junior lien may impose on the borrower an additional monthly cash
outflow obligation, straining the borrower’s limited resources and increasing the probability of
a default. Id. However, refinancing lenders can (and generally do) require borrowers to
complete loan application forms that identify, or negate the existence of, such junior liens. A
sworn affidavit on the point might be required as additional protection for the lender.

313

1NELSON.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/5/2006 11:48 AM

[2006

requirement, thus allowing the lender to offer refinancing to
prospective customers at a lower total cost to them.36
Under what conditions is subrogation to the prior mortgage
available to a refinancing lender? The answer is controversial and may
depend on the nature and extent of the refinancing lender’s
knowledge or notice of the existence of intervening liens. The
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages takes a very expansive
view of the application of the subrogation principle. The
Restatement holds that the refinancing lender should be entitled to
subrogation even if it had actual knowledge of a junior lien, if it
“reasonably expected to receive a security interest in the real estate
with the priority of the mortgage being discharged, and if
subrogation will not materially prejudice the holders of intervening
interests in the real estate.”37 Moreover, “[a] refinancing mortgagee
should be found to lack such an expectation only where there is
affirmative proof that the mortgagee intended to subordinate its
mortgage to the intervening interest.”38 In recent years, a significant
number of courts have adopted the Restatement or followed its
logic.39
Some courts are more conservative than the Restatement
approach in recognizing subrogation. One group, probably the
majority of all courts nationally, refuses subrogation if the payor had
36. See infra text accompanying notes 160–195.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. : MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4)(1997).
38. Id. § 7.6 cmt. e; see also id. illus. 27.
39. Cases adopting the Restatement approach include Lamb Excavation, Inc. v. Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 95 P.3d 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); E. Sav. Bank v. Pappas, 829
A.2d 953 (D.C. 2003) (dictum); Wilkins v. Gibson, 38 S.E. 374 (Ga. 1901); Bank of N.Y. v.
Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644 (Ind. 2005); Klotz v. Klotz, 440 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989);
E. Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1998); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63
S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Houston v. Bank of Am., 78 P.3d 71 (Nev. 2003);
Providence Inst. for Sav. v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1969); Farm Credit Bank v. Ogden,
886 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App. 1994); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawrence Invs., Inc., 782 S.W.2d
332 (Tex. App. 1989); see also Trus Joist Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 603
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), rev’d sub nom., Trus Joist Corp. v. Treetop Assocs., 477
A.2d 817 (N.J. 1984). Several intermediate appellate courts have expressed approval of the
Restatement approach, but have declined to apply it because they considered themselves
bound by earlier state supreme court decisions that were less favorable to subrogation. See
Ripley v. Piehl, 700 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller,
863 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Bank of Am. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 109 P.3d 863
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005). The Colorado Supreme Court came close to adopting the
Restatement view in Hicks v. Londre, 125 P.3d 452 (Colo. 2005), but indicated that it might
deny subrogation if the refinancing lender was a sophisticated commercial lender with actual
knowledge of the intervening interest.
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actual knowledge of the intervening interest, but allows subrogation
if the payor’s only notice was constructive from the recordation of
the intervening interest.40 This approach places a premium on
ignorance—not such a bad thing in the present context. If the
refinancing lender can preserve the right to subrogation by avoiding
knowledge (e.g., by refraining from obtaining a title examination),
then refraining from examining the title is an entirely rational step
and has the added advantage of saving money.
In addition to the Restatement approach and the more
conservative approach that permits subrogation unless the
refinancing lender had actual knowledge of the intervening lien,
there is a third approach, which is the most hostile to the refinancing
lender. It denies subrogation even if the payor’s only knowledge of
the intervening interest was constructive notice from the recording
of that interest.41 We have vigorously criticized this approach42 and
40. See Vogel v. Veneman, 276 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Texas law); United
States v. Baran, 996 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying New York law); Han v. United States,
944 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying California law); United States v. Hughes, 499 F.2d
322 (8th Cir. 1974) (applying Arkansas law); Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir.
1937); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Grissett, 500 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Ala. 1980); United
States v. Fagin, 252 B.R. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000) (applying Texas law); In re Hubbard,
89 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1988); Herberman v. Bergstrom, 816 P.2d 244 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Feldsher, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Smith
v. State Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Pappas, 829 A.2d 953
(adopting the Restatement in dictum, but actually holding merely that constructive notice to
the refinancing lender would not bar its subrogation claim); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. First Sec.
Bank, 491 P.2d 1261 (Idaho 1971); La. Nat’l Bank v. Belello, 577 So. 2d 1099 (La. Ct. App.
1991); United Carolina Bank v. Beesley, 663 A.2d 574 (Me. 1995); Metrobank for Sav. v.
Nat’l Cmty. Bank, 620 A.2d 433 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Gerenstein v. Williams,
723 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Home Title Guar. Co. v. Carey, 144 N.Y.S.2d 116
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955); Rusher v. Bunker, 782 P.2d 170 (Or. 1989); Pee Dee State Bank v.
Prosser, 367 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), overruled by United Carolina Bank v.
Caroprop, Ltd., 446 S.E.2d 415 (S.C. 1994); Pierner v. Computer Res. & Tech., Inc., 1998
WL 51496 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished opinion).
41. See In re Gordon, 164 B.R. 706 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (applying Florida law);
Indep. One Mortgage Corp. v. Katsaros, 681 A.2d 1005 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Hieber v.
Fla. Nat’l Bank, 522 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Bank of Canton v. Nelson, 160
S.E. 232 (Ga. 1931); Harms v. Burt, 40 P.3d 329 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); Thompson v. Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 90 S.W.3d 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Metmor Fin., Inc. v.
Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Barnes,
623 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Harmon, 2002 WL
1980705 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (unpublished opinion); Centreville Car Care, Inc. v. N. Am.
Mortgage Co., 559 S.E.2d 870 (Va. 2002); Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665 (Wash. 2001), modified,
43 P.3d 1222 (Wash. 2001); see also Belcher v. Belcher, 87 P.2d 762 (Or. 1939). The
continuing vitality of Belcher v. Belcher is uncertain in light of Rusher v. Bunker, 782 P.2d 170
(Or. Ct. App. 1989), which refused to bar subrogation where the payor had only constructive
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find it impossible to understand in light of the fact that subrogation
in this situation harms no one, leaving the intervening lien exactly
where it started. In contrast, refusal to grant subrogation gives the
intervening lienor an unexpected, unearned, and unwarranted
promotion in priority.43
This last approach, in effect, forces the refinancing lender to
obtain new title insurance,44 and it casts the loss on the refinancing
lender in the first instance if no title insurance is issued or is issued in

notice of the intervening lien. See Dimeo v. Gesik, 993 P.2d 183 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)
(declining to resolve the issue on summary judgment). The position of the Kansas courts is also
in doubt as a result of the holding in National City Mortgage Co. v. Ross, 117 P.3d 880 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2005), granting subrogation even though the refinancing lender had constructive
notice of the intervening interest (a purchaser’s interest in a real estate installment contract) by
virtue of the possession of the contract purchasers.
Michigan appears to be alone in denying subrogation on the ground that a refinancing
lender is a “mere volunteer,” since it has no legal obligation to pay off the prior mortgage. See
Wash. Mut. Bank v. ShoreBank Corp., 703 N.W.2d 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). This position
disregards the widely held understanding that subrogation can be granted to one who pays a
debt at the request of the debtor, as a refinancing lender obviously does. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) (1997).
42. See 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 10.6, at 802.
43. Exceptional situations can arise in which subrogation would be unjust to the
intervening lienor, but they arise only when the parties depart from normal procedure. For
example, in Bankers Trust Co. v. Collins, 124 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), a lender
made a loan to refinance a prior recorded mortgage, but the refinancing mortgage was not
recorded. Subsequently, a different mortgagee made a loan on the property with no notice of
the prior unrecorded mortgage. Since the later mortgagee was a bona fide purchaser, it was
held to have priority over the unrecorded loan on the basis of the recording act. Id. at 578–79.
The holder of the unrecorded mortgage attempted to defeat this argument by asserting that it
was subrogated to the (recorded) mortgage it had paid off. The court correctly rejected this
argument. Id. at 579–80. Since the original mortgage that had been refinanced was discharged
of record, and the refinancing mortgage was unrecorded, it would have been unjust to grant it
priority over the bona fide purchaser. Id. at 579. In re Lewis, 270 B.R. 215 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2001), is similar, except that it involved the strong-arm rights of a trustee in bankruptcy
rather than an actual intervening lienor.
The same sort of problem can arise if the original mortgage is discharged of record but a
delay occurs in recording the refinancing mortgage. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. f, illus. 30 (1997). However, this is an extremely rare situation. The
usual case is just the opposite: the new mortgage is recorded immediately after closing, while
the discharge of the old mortgage is not recorded for several weeks or months. See UNIFORM
RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE
SATISFACTION
ACT,
Prefatory
Note
(2004),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umsa/2004finalact.pdf (holding that a refinancing
mortgagee was not entitled to subrogation where it made no title examination before making
its loan).
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error. Of course, if a new title policy is in fact obtained, as is usually
the case, the ultimate loss if the title examination fails to identify an
intervening lien falls on the title insurance underwriter. Indeed, a
number of the decisions in this category seem to be motivated by
nothing less than undisguised hostility to the title insurance
industry.45 They express the view that, if the title insurer makes a
search error, it ought to pay for it even when the payment is merely
compensation for giving the intervening lienor the unearned
promotion in priority mentioned above. This attitude is inexplicable.
It makes no more sense to deny subrogation to a title insurer here
than it would to deny a fire insurer subrogation against an arsonist or
to deny a liability insurer subrogation against a tortfeasor. Insurers,
after all, are not simply vast reservoirs of free money. They pay claims
out of the premiums paid by their insureds, and if they are forced to
pay unnecessary claims, the competitive forces of the insurance
market will inevitably drive their premiums upward, making
settlement costs higher for all mortgagors. There is simply no reason
to impose on consumers the cost of giving windfall promotions of
priority to junior lienholders.

45. The following passages indicate this hostility:
Another factor in our determination, and one which [the refinancing lender] urges
us to ignore, is whether a title insurer had an opportunity to review the title and find
the recorded judgment lien. That a title insurer was paid to perform precisely the
function that would have revealed the [intervening] judgment lien is a factor within
the purview of a determination of the equities.
Wilshire Servicing Corp. v. Timber Ridge P’ship, 743 N.E.2d 1173, 1179–80 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001).
Under a contractual obligation, [the title insurance company] was negligent in
giving its expert opinion and insuring title. The doctrine of subrogation does not
apply to relieve a title insurance company of its contractual obligation because a title
insurance company not only receives consideration for rendering an expert opinion,
but also for acting as an insurer of its accuracy. [The company] failed to discover a
recorded and perfected judgment lien and upon receiving actual notice, failed to
disclose or remedy the situation.
Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665, 672 (Wash. 2001) (citation omitted), modified, 43 P.3d 1222
(Wash. 2001).
[A]ny “windfall” in this case as a result of granting subrogation would inure to the
benefit of the negligent title examiner and the party that insured the title for [the
refinancing lender and purchasers]. While [they] have recourse against those parties
for the loss in this case, [the intervening lienor] has no such recourse.
Centreville Car Care, Inc. v. N. Am. Mortgage Co., 559 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Va. 2002); see also
Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat’l Bank, 792 So. 2d 1222, 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
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B. Avoiding Material Prejudice to Intervening Interests
As noted above, all courts deny subrogation to the refinancing
lender to the extent that subrogation would result in “material
prejudice” to intervening interests.46 Here we consider how such
material prejudice might arise and what its impact might be. When a
mortgage is refinanced, the parties often modify some of the loan
terms. The most common changes are an increase in the loan’s
balance (often known as a “cash-out” refinancing) and an increase in
the term to maturity. A third type of modification, also fairly
frequent, is a change from an adjustable interest rate to a fixed rate.
The purpose of this Section is to evaluate whether such
modifications represent “material prejudice” and the impact that
such changes are likely to have on a mortgage’s priority in relation to
junior liens.
Cash-out residential refinancings have become increasingly
common over the past decade.47 Federal Reserve Board survey data
indicate that in 1994 only about 25% of refinancing homeowners
increased their loan balances; in 1998 and 1999 about 35% did so.48
By 2001–2002 the proportion of cash-out refinancings had risen to
45%.49 Data for loans refinanced by Freddie Mac50 indicate a peak in
cash-outs during 2000, with some reduction since that time and an
overall cash-out rate for the 1999–2004 period of about 56%.51

46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4).
47. The risks to borrowers of “cash-out” refinancing are discussed in William R.
Emmons, Consumer-Finance Myths and Other Obstacles to Financial Literacy, Dec. 8, 2004
(unpublished paper presented at the St. Louis University School of Law),
http://law.slu.edu/conf/lending/docs/Emmons_lending_Conference04.pdf.
48. Peter J. Brady et al., The Effects of Recent Mortgage Refinancing, FED. RES. BULL.,
July 2000, at 441, 445.
49. Canner et al., supra note 20, at 469, 472.
50. Freddie Mac, one of the two federally chartered secondary mortgage-market
purchasers, defines a cash-out refinance as one in which the balance of the loan is increased by
more than 5%. This definition recognizes that many homeowners need to borrow enough,
over and above their preexisting loan balances, to cover the settlement costs of the refinancing.
An increase of 5% in loan balance will typically permit the mortgagor to recover little or no
actual cash for other purposes.
51. Averaging the percentage of quarterly cash-out refinancings reported by Freddie
Mac from 1999 through 2004 yields the following percentages: 1999: 64%; 2000: 79%; 2001:
55%; 2002: 52%; 2003: 38%; 2004: 50%. See News Release, Freddie Mac, Cash-out Refinance
Share Falls Modestly in Fourth Quarter 2004, Feb. 1, 2005, http://www.freddiemac.com/
news/archives/rates/2005/4qupb04.html.
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Cash-out refinancings are potentially problematic in terms of the
“material prejudice to junior lienors” test mentioned above.52 If we
assume that under the operation of the subrogation doctrine
discussed above, the priority of the original mortgage will be
available to the refinancing lender, an increase in the balance owing
on the loan may be harmful to the interests of the junior lienors. As
the Restatement points out:
Subrogation will be recognized only if it will not materially
prejudice the holders of intervening interests. The most obvious
illustration is that of a [lender] who lends the mortgagor more
money than is necessary to discharge the preexisting mortgage. The
[lender] is subrogated only to the extent that the funds disbursed
are actually applied toward payment of the prior lien. There is no
right of subrogation with respect to any excess funds.53

There can be no serious doubt that a higher loan balance, or an
increased interest rate that results in a slower reduction in the loan
balance (so that at any given future date, the loan will have a higher
balance than would have been the case under its original
amortization schedule), prejudices the positions of any intervening
interest-holders.54 The increase in balance on the prior mortgage
52. See supra text accompanying note 35.
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1997).
54. See Shane v. Winter Hill Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 492 N.E.2d 92 (Mass. 1986)
(finding that an interest rate increase in excess of the 1% “default interest kickup” provided for
in the original mortgage documents was prejudicial to junior mortgagee and hence not
binding upon it); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
extensions of time for payment did not materially prejudice an intervening lienor but that
additions of various fees to the mortgage balance and inclusion of cross-default clause did
cause prejudice, and should therefore be denied priority pro tanto as against the intervening
lien); Fleet Bank of N.Y. v. County of Monroe Indus. Dev. Agency, 637 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996) (agreeing with the Restatement test and finding that a material issue of fact
existed as to material prejudice); Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Ass’n, 594 N.Y.S.2d 890
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding that an increase in interest rate materially prejudiced the
intervening lienor but that a pro tanto loss of priority of the senior mortgage, to the extent that
the higher interest resulted in a higher loan balance, was the appropriate remedy); Mergener v.
Fuhr, 208 N.W. 267 (Wis. 1926) (holding that an increase in interest rate would result in a pro
tanto loss of priority of the senior mortgage to an intervening lien).
Courts sometimes suggest that the prejudice may be so substantial as to warrant complete
rather than a pro tanto loss in priority. “This sanction may be called for where the increase in
the senior mortgage obligation is so substantial that no equity whatsoever remains to secure
junior liens.” 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 802. But see E. Sav. Bank v. Pappas,
829 A.2d 953 (D.C. 2003) (concluding that even a substantial interest rate increase did not
result in material prejudice to the junior lienors); Dorothy Edwards Realtors, Inc. v. McAdams,
525 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a mortgage modification deferring some
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places them farther down the “food chain,” and, if foreclosure
becomes necessary, their probability of recovering their debts out of
the property is reduced. The scenario of the increased rate is not
particularly relevant here because mortgagors ordinarily refinance to
get lower interest rates, not higher ones,55 and a lowered rate is
obviously advantageous to intervening lienors. But an increased loan
balance plainly represents an increased exposure to risk to the
intervening lienholders.
We need to consider how much additional money is typically
involved. Federal Reserve Board data for residential refinancings in
2001–2002 indicates that, for mortgagors taking cash out by
refinancing,56 the mean loan balance before refinancing was nearly
$125,931. The amount of new cash raised by the refinancing57 had a
mean of $26,723 and a median of $18,500.58 Remarkably, even after
the refinancing, the loans in the survey had loan-to-value ratios of
only 62.9% (mean) or 65% (median)59—levels perceived as having
very low default risk by the residential mortgage industry.60
payments and increasing the interest rate did not prejudice an intervening lienor). But see
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 623 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), in
which the court flatly denied subrogation, in part because the borrowers had drawn down an
additional $1,573 in addition to paying off about $114,000 on two prior deeds of trust. It
seems not to have occurred to the court to grant pro tanto subrogation.
55. Averaging the quarterly ratios of old to new interest rates reported by Freddie Mac
from 2001 through 2004 yields an overall average ratio of 1.19 to 1. See News Release,
Freddie Mac, Cash-out Refinance Share Falls Modestly in Fourth Quarter 2004, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/rates/2005/4qupb04.html. Stated differently,
the average residential mortgagor was able to reduce his or her interest rate by about 16% by
refinancing. Federal Reserve Board data for 2001–2002 indicate that 96% of mortgagors who
refinanced during this period obtained lower interest rates, with an average reduction of 1.83
percentage points. See Canner et al., supra note 20, at 471.
56. The Federal Reserve Board data is based on a definition of “cash out” as any new
loan having a balance exceeding the amount due on the preexisting loan plus closing costs. See
Canner et al., supra note 20, at 473 tbl.7.
57. Note that this full amount did not necessarily become available to the mortgagors
for other expenditures since some portion of it was inevitably eaten up by title insurance, loan
fees, appraisal fees, and other expenses of refinancing.
58. See Canner et al., supra note 20, at 473.
59. Id.
60. It has long been recognized that loan-to-value ratio is a very strong—perhaps the
best—predictor of the probability of mortgage default. See, e.g., Carl E. Case & Robert J.
Shiller, Mortgage Default Risk and Real Estate Prices: The Use of Index-Based Futures and
Options in Real Estate, 7 J. HOUSING RES. 243, 245 (1996) (“Strong evidence . . . shows that
the best single predictor of default is the current ratio of loan to market value for each
property.”). Lower loan-to-value ratios produce lower default rates because (1) borrowers with
larger equities have more to lose when a default occurs, and consequently try harder to avoid
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The impact of the additional loan balance is likely to be far less
than at first appears. The refinancing mortgagee in the average
transaction described above would have a loan balance of $152,654
but mortgage priority and title insurance coverage of only
$125,931—a shortfall of about 17.5% of the total loan amount. This
may initially seem to be a serious deficiency, but two factors must be
remembered. First, the low loan-to-value ratio makes a default in
payment by the mortgagor very unlikely. Second, even if the loan-tovalue ratio were significantly higher, the fact that the subrogation
doctrine confers mortgage priority on 82.5% of the new loan balance
might still be a sufficient incentive to a title insurer to cover the
entire new loan balance at a significantly reduced rate.
Refinancing loans also commonly provide for longer
amortization periods than the loans they replace. However, it is
highly unlikely that “stretching out” the term for payment of the
loan would be considered “materially prejudicial” to intervening
junior interests.61 Usually “courts assume that extensions of maturity
reduce the likelihood of foreclosure of the senior mortgage and
hence that they are helpful, rather than prejudicial, to the interests of
junior lienors.”62 There is a “strong presumption” against finding
prejudice in this context.63 Except in extreme cases,64 we agree with
this view.

default; and (2) borrowers with larger equities are more likely, when faced with a financial
crisis, to be able to sell the property and realize a positive net cash return after paying
transaction costs and the mortgage balance.
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 cmt. c (1997) takes the view
in a related context that “[a]bsent an increase in the principal amount or the interest rate of
the mortgage, such modifications normally do not jeopardize the mortgagee’s priority as
against intervening interests. . . . Extensions of maturity generally reduce the likelihood of
foreclosure of the senior mortgage and thus are beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to the
interests of junior lienors.” Cases that agree with this position include Shultis v. Woodstock
Land Development Associates., 594 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), and Lennar
Northeastern Partners v. Buice, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 442–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
This position is not beyond debate. An increase in maturity may well reduce the
monthly cash obligations of the borrower, making default less likely, but it also means that the
loan will amortize more slowly, and, hence, will have a higher balance at any given point in
time before it is fully paid. The higher balance is obviously detrimental to junior lienors if a
foreclosure of the senior mortgage occurs. The courts have usually disregarded this factor, or
have assumed that the detriment is outweighed by the benefit of the lower probability of
default. See Shultis, 594 N.Y.S.2d 890; Lennar Ne. Partners, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 cmt. c and Reporter’s Note (1997).
62. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 800.
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 cmt. b.
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Of course, changes in maturity as a result of refinancing can go
in either direction. During the past several years a common form of
refinancing has involved shortening, rather than lengthening, the
maturity of the earlier loan. For example, the refinancing loan may
have a fifteen-year amortization, while the loan being paid off was for
a thirty-year term. Even though such transactions almost always
result in a significantly lower interest rate, the shorter amortization
period sometimes means that the monthly payments will actually
increase. Of course, the borrower will need to be satisfied with his or
her own ability to make the higher payments, and the refinancing
lender will ordinarily insist on qualifying the borrower by examining
his or her ability to do so.65
From the viewpoint of the junior lien-holder, the refinancing of a
senior mortgage loan with a shorter term than the original senior
mortgage represents both good news and bad news. The good news
is that the senior debt will be discharged more rapidly and ultimately
be paid in full earlier than if the refinancing had not occurred. The
64. Such an “extreme case” arguably existed in Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665 (Wash. 2001),
modified, 43 P.3d 1222 (Wash. 2001), in which the original mortgage loan had a six-year
maturity but was refinanced with a loan having a thirty-year maturity (but a much lower
interest rate). The court found that the extension of the loan term prejudiced the junior lienor,
who held a judgment lien. Id. at 669. The original loan had a fifteen-year amortization
schedule with a balloon payment due after six years, while the refinancing loan (made three
years and four months later) had a thirty-year amortization schedule and no balloon payment.
Hence, the new loan amortized more slowly than the old one; under the original loan terms,
the loan would have had a balance of $100,134 at the time of the balloon payoff in January
2002, while the new loan would have had a balance of $115,807 on that date. On the other
hand, because of the interest rate reduction (from 10.5% to 6.75%), the borrower’s monthly
payment was reduced nearly one-half, from $1,437 to $785.
It is not easy to say whether the change in loan terms was prejudicial to the judgment
lienholder. If the borrowers defaulted on the new loan during the period prior to the old
loan’s balloon maturity, and the new loan was foreclosed, the judgment lienholder would have
realized less money after the senior mortgage was paid—potentially as much as $15,000 less,
depending on the date of foreclosure. However, the probability of a default by the borrowers
was surely reduced significantly by the huge reduction in their monthly payment. It is simply
unclear to which mortgage, the old or the new one, the judgment lienor would have preferred
to be subordinate.
65. A common method of qualification requires proof that the monthly payments will
not exceed a given percentage of the borrower’s household income. That percentage will
usually be in the range of 28% to 33%, depending on the particular lender’s policies. An
additional “total expense ratio” test, often applied, requires proof that the combination of the
borrower’s mortgage payment and all other monthly debt payments not exceed a percentage,
typically 33% to 41%, of the borrower’s household income. See Jack M. Guttentag, Qualifying
for a Mortgage, Dec. 12, 2000, http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%20Qualifying/
qualifying_for_a_mortgage.htm.
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bad news is that the borrower may have a larger monthly obligation
to meet, thus increasing the borrower’s financial stress and
potentially leading to a default on either the senior or junior debt.
Nonetheless, except in extreme cases66 this sort of refinancing should
not result in a finding of prejudice to junior lienors. While higher
monthly payments may impact the mortgagor’s cash flow and
conceivably make his or her ability to service the junior lien more
problematic, the transaction clearly also benefits the junior interest.
For example, assume the borrower’s old loan for $100,000
carried a 7.5% interest and an original term of 30 years, with 25 years
remaining at the time of refinancing. Monthly payments on such a
loan would be $700 per month, and it would have a balance owing
of $94,510 when refinanced. Assume that the borrower refinances
that balance with a new loan at 6% interest for 15 years. The new
monthly payments will be $798, an increase of nearly $100. Despite
the increased cash flow, because of the lower interest rate and shorter
amortization on the new senior mortgage, the mortgagor’s total
interest obligation is reduced and the junior’s position is thus
strengthened.
In sum we believe, and the courts generally agree,67 that changes
in senior loan maturity, at least within a “normal” range of ten to
thirty years, should be disregarded in examining prejudice to junior
lienors. “Cash-out” refinancings that involve increases of loan
balance may be considered prejudicial to juniors, but only if they
increase the loan-to-value ratio above the 75% or 80% range since
only above that range do residential mortgage loans exhibit a
significant risk of default.

66. By “extreme cases,” we mean situations in which the borrower’s monthly payments
increase drastically, the term is reduced drastically, or where the borrower would not have been
able to qualify for the refinancing loan under ordinary payment-to-income ratio requirements.
See supra note 65. An illustration is provided by Gluskin v. Atlantic Savings & Loan Ass’n, 108
Cal. Rptr. 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), in which “[t]he principal amount of the loan was reduced
[from $2.2 million] to $712,530, the interest rate was raised from 6 1/4% to 10%, the
monthly payments reduced to approximately $5,900 and the maturity of the note shortened
[from 30 years] to 10 months (with a balloon payment at the end).” Id. at 321. The court
refused to enforce the change against a subordinating lienholder. Id. at 325.
67. As to maturity extensions, see authorities cited supra notes 61–62. We have found
no case authorities involving a reduction of maturity.
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C. Refinancing by the Same Lender
Refinancings by the same lender may use either of two different
formats. In the first, which is analogous to a refinancing by a new
lender considered above, the lender cancels the original note and
releases its mortgage of record. At the same time, the mortgagor
executes a new note and mortgage and the lender promptly records
the mortgage. A new lender’s title insurance policy normally will be
issued and the premium will be paid by the mortgagor. This type of
refinancing is appropriately termed a “replacement transaction.”
In the second type of refinancing transaction by the same lender,
the original note and mortgage are simply modified by a written
agreement. No new money is advanced by the lender. We describe
this as a “modification transaction.” The original mortgage is not
released of record; rather, the modification agreement is promptly
recorded. An actual modification transaction from a few years ago
provides an example. The original loan carried a fixed rate for five
years at 7%. At the end of the five-year period it would convert to a
variable-rate loan. It was refinanced at the then-current balance
during its second year at a fixed interest rate of 5.75% for an
additional five years at which time it would convert to a variable rate.
The mortgagor paid the mortgagee a fixed fee of several hundred
dollars and executed a modification agreement which the lender
recorded. A new lender’s title policy was not required, making it a
very efficient transaction.
Our overall concern in same-lender refinancings is the same as in
new-lender refinancings discussed above: whether title insurance
protection is needed against the risk that an intervening lien will gain
priority over the new loan. Let us consider how mortgage law treats
intervening junior lienors in each of the foregoing situations. The
replacement transaction is usually not governed by subrogation
principles.68 This is because “subrogation cannot be involved unless
the second loan is made by a different lender than the holder of the
first mortgage; one cannot be subrogated to one’s own previous

68. There are a few judicial opinions to the contrary, applying subrogation to benefit
lenders that refinanced their own prior mortgages. See, e.g., Rush v. Alaska Mortgage Group,
937 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1997); W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Denver v. Ben Gay, Inc., 436 P.2d
121 (Colo. 1967); Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat’l Bank of Fla., 792 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001). These courts evince confusion as to the proper context for application of
subrogation.
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mortgage.”69 Rather, a different body of law, employing principles
similar to subrogation, is usually applied. Under section 7.3 of the
Restatement, when
a senior mortgage is released of record and, as part of the same
transaction, is replaced with a new mortgage, the latter mortgage
retains the same priority as its predecessor, except to the extent that
any change in the terms of the mortgage or the obligation it
secures is materially prejudicial to the holder of a junior interest in
the real estate.70

The test of material prejudice for replacement purposes is the same as
in the subrogation context. An increase in the principal amount is
deemed prejudicial, as is an increase in the interest rate if the rate in
the original mortgage was fixed.71
The same principles also govern modification transactions.
According to the Restatement and the substantial case law
supporting it, “[i]f a senior mortgage or the obligation it secures is
modified by the parties, the mortgage as modified retains priority as
against junior interests in the real estate, except to the extent that the
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1997).
70. Id. § 7.3(a). Many of the cases that are the basis for this Section articulate the rule
slightly differently—they confer priority on the replacement mortgage as against intervening
lienors unless “paramount equities” are present. This phrase, like “material prejudice,” is
grounded in the notion of detrimental reliance. Both the Restatement formulation and the
cases reflect the same normative principle. The Restatement uses the words “material
prejudice” simply because they are more descriptive than the “paramount equities” language.
See id. § 7.3 Reporter’s Note to cmt. b; see also Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Riede, 565 So. 2d
883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Winnetka Bank, 614 N.E.2d 862
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Rebel v. Nat’l City Bank of Evansville, 598 N.E.2d 1108 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992); Jackson & Scherer, Inc. v. Washburn, 496 P.2d 1358 (Kan. 1972); Guleserian v.
Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1966); Commerce Sav. Lincoln, Inc. v. Robinson, 331 N.W.2d
495 (Neb. 1983); Houston Lumber Co. v. Skaggs, 613 P.2d 416 (N.M. 1980); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Barnhart, 862 P.2d 1243, 1248 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]here a senior
mortgagee discharges its mortgage of record and contemporaneously takes a new mortgage,
the senior mortgagee’s lien is not subordinated to intervening liens in the absence of (1)
evidence of an intent to subordinate, or (2) paramount equities in favor of junior lienholders
that justify subordinating the senior mortgagee’s lien”—the court refers to this as “equitable
reinstatement.”); Skaneateles Sav. Bank v. Herold, 376 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975);
Hummel v. Hummel, 896 P.2d 1203 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995); Kellogg Bros. Lumber v.
Mularkey, 252 N.W.2d 596 (Wis. 1934). Contra Hilco, Inc. v. Lenentine, 698 A.2d 1254
(N.H. 1997) (refusing to recognize the senior’s mortgagee’s priority for its replacement
mortgage where it had constructive notice of the intervening liens). The Hilco case is similar to
the rigid view of subrogation reflected in the cases cited supra note 41.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3(a) cmt. b (1997); 1 NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 799.
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modification is materially prejudicial to the holders of such
interests.”72 As in the subrogation and replacement mortgage
contexts, while a decrease in interest rate73 or an extension of the
maturity of a senior mortgage74 is not deemed prejudicial, increases
in either interest rate or the principal amount of the obligation will
result in a pro tanto loss of priority.75
In one important respect, both replacement and modification
lenders receive more favorable treatment than their subrogation
counterparts. As we have seen, many states that have not yet adopted
the Restatement approach to subrogation demote in priority new
refinancing lenders who have actual or constructive knowledge of

72. Id. § 7.3(b); see, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. BVS Dev., Inc., 42 F.3d 1206 (9th
Cir. 1994); Crutchfield v. Johnson & Latimer, 8 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1942); Lennar Ne. Partners
v. Buice, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Eurovest Ltd. v. 13290 Biscayne Island
Terrace Corp., 559 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d
223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nuernberger, 284 N.W. 266 (Neb.
1939); Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Ass’n., 594 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993);
Skaneateles Sav. Bank v. Herold, 376 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
73. See, e.g., Big Land Inv. Corp. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 657 P.2d 837
(Alaska 1983) (decrease in interest rate does not prejudice the interests of junior lienors).
Contra Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank of S.C. v. Smith, 284 S.E.2d 770 (S.C. 1981).
74. See In re Fowler, 83 B.R. 39 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (reamortization of two senior
mortgages after an intervening judgment lien did not affect the priority of those mortgages);
Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1966) (maturity extension of senior mortgage did
not impair its priority); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); 1
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 799–800.
75. See, e.g., Bank of Searcy v. Kroh, 114 S.W.2d 26 (Ark. 1938); Lennar Ne. Partners,
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435, 442 (“[W]hen the obligation is increased, by an increase in the
principal amount or an increase in the interest rate, the junior lienholder’s position is
worsened. . . . [T]he impairment to [junior’s] security and its rights as a junior lienholder
caused by the modification can be fully eliminated by denying priority to the modification.”);
Burney, 63 S.W.3d at 232 (“‘[W]here the modification entails an increase in the senior
mortgage interest rate or an increase in its principal amount, the junior lienor will gain priority
over the earlier mortgage to the extent of the modification’” (quoting 1 GRANT S. NELSON &
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE § 9.4 (3d. ed. 1993))); Fleet Bank v. County of
Monroe Indus. Dev. Agency, 637 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Where,
however, the actions of the senior lienor prejudice the junior lienors but do not substantially
impair their security interest or destroy their equity, the senior lienor will be required to
relinquish to the junior lienors its priority with respect to the modified terms only.”). Where
the modifications are extreme, the senior mortgage may sometimes completely lose its priority:
One situation might be where there is a substantial increase in the mortgage interest
rate and a long term evenly amortized payment schedule is changed to a one year
balloon mortgage. This sanction may also be called for where the increase in the
senior mortgage is so substantial that no equity whatsoever remains to secure junior
liens.
1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 801–02.
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intervening interests.76 By way of contrast, in the context of
replacement mortgages and modification of mortgages, there is no
similar penalty on the lender for having actual or constructive
knowledge of intervening liens. Indeed, in this context, the lender’s
knowledge is irrelevant. This is true under both the Restatement and
the case law.77
In sum, case law currently protects refinancing lenders in both
the replacement and modification contexts against intervening junior
interests so long as neither the interest rate nor the principal amount
of the prior loan is increased. The applicable Restatement sections
are consistent with these cases. As we have already seen, refinancing
lenders find less protection in subrogation decisions in many
jurisdictions because the right to subrogation is conditioned upon
the lender’s absence of knowledge of intervening interests. Under
the Restatement, however, protection is afforded to the new lender
irrespective of such knowledge. The Restatement requires only that
the new lender expected to have the priority of the old mortgage—
and that expectation should be presumed, as the Restatement says,78
in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent on the part of the new
lender.
The Restatement rule is the fairest approach because it rejects
conferring a windfall on intervenors who, after all, do not acquire
their liens and other interests with the expectation of being anything
but subordinate to a senior mortgage. Courts that refuse to follow
this approach offer no policy reasons for doing so, but only the
moralistic argument that the refinancing lender should be ashamed
of itself for not being more careful—an attitude that tacitly assumes
the refinancing lender must spend (or more realistically, force its
borrower to spend) the cost of a new title examination. More
generally, the Restatement approach is friendly to first mortgage
refinancing, a process that clearly is beneficial to homeowners.
Consequently, as a normative matter, we strongly urge the adoption
of the Restatement subrogation rule. It has already gained

76. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 (1997). For the most
part, the case law simply ignores the notice issue; see cases cited supra notes 70, 72. The one
exception seems to be Hilco, Inc. v. Lenentine, 698 A.2d 1254 (N.H. 1997).
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e, illus. 27 (1997).
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considerable ground, and we believe and hope it is well on its way to
becoming the predominant rule.79
IV. HELPING SUBROGATION WORK:
TWO SIMPLE MORTGAGE CLAUSES
While the Restatement’s approach to subrogation has enjoyed a
strong positive judicial reception since its 1997 adoption,80 there are
two simple mortgage clauses that, if widely adopted in mortgage
forms, would greatly strengthen subrogation’s effectiveness in the
context of mortgage refinancings and advance the overall goal of
avoiding most or all of the expense of a new title examination. The
first, discussed in Section A below, is a clause expressly stating that
the mortgagee intends to have the priority of the previous mortgage
it is paying off, and the second, discussed in Section B below, is a
“future advance” clause.
A. Adopting “Conventional” Subrogation
The first of these clauses stems from the concept of
“conventional” subrogation. A word of explanation is in order here.
The concept of subrogation referred to thus far in this Article, and in
the great majority of judicial decisions, is usually termed “equitable”
subrogation, and courts often say they will award it only when

79. One court recently described the traditional notice-based approach to subrogation
as being “rapidly eroded” in favor of the Restatement approach. Bank of Am. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 109 P.3d 863, 868 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). That court quite obviously would have
preferred to adopt the Restatement rule, but was constrained from doing so by the stare decisis
effect of the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665, modified, 43
P.3d 1222 (Wash. 2001).
80. See Lamb Excavation, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 95 P.3d 542 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2004); E. Sav. Bank v. Pappas, 829 A.2d 953 (D.C. 2003); Wilkins v. Gibson, 38
S.E. 374 (Ga. 1901); Bank of N.Y. v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644 (Ind. 2005); Klotz v. Klotz, 440
N.W.2d 406 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); E. Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331 (Mass.
1998); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Providence Inst. for Sav.
v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1969); Farm Credit Bank v. Ogden, 886 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.
App. 1994); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawrence Invs., Inc., 782 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App. 1989); see
also Trus Joist Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1983), rev’d sub nom., Trus Joist Corp. v. Treetop Assocs., Inc., 477 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1984).
Several lower courts have endorsed the Restatement approach, but have refused to apply it
because they considered themselves bound by earlier state supreme court decisions that were
less favorable to subrogation. See First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004); Bank of Am. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 109 P.3d 863 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
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equitable considerations require it.81 There is, however, an alternate
version of subrogation—conventional subrogation—which is said to
rest on the existence of an agreement to give the refinancing lender
the priority of the mortgage which it pays.
If such an agreement existed between the refinancing lender and
the intervening lienor, no one would doubt its effectiveness; in
effect, it would constitute a subordination agreement by the
intervenor, preventing its lien from being promoted in priority when
the original first mortgage was paid. But the remarkable thing about
conventional subrogation is that the agreement need not involve the
intervening lienor in any way, rather, it can simply be an agreement
between the refinancing lender and the borrower. As the Nebraska
Court of Appeals recently put it, “[c]onventional subrogation arises
where one pays the debt of another under an agreement, existing at
the time of the payment, with either the debtor or the creditor, that
the person paying shall be subrogated to the liens existing as security
for the debt.”82 It is extremely doubtful that conventional

81. See, e.g., Kim, 31 P.3d at 669 (“Subrogation is fundamentally an equitable concept
designed ‘to impose ultimate responsibility for a wrong or loss on the party who, in equity and
good conscience, ought to bear it.’” (quoting Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 640 (Wash.
1998))).
82. Am. Nat’l Bank v. Clark, 660 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003) (citing
Hoppe v. Phoenix Homes, Inc., 318 N.W.2d 878 (Neb. 1982)) (emphasis added). Cases
actually applying conventional mortgage subrogation (rather than merely recognizing the
concept) are fairly sparse. See, e.g., Vogel v. Veneman, 276 F.3d 729, 735 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“Contractual subrogation arises when ‘a person advances money to take up and extend
indebtedness secured by a vendor’s lien on land under an agreement that such person shall
stand in the place of the original holder of the indebtedness.’ . . . A valid deed of trust
executed by both the borrower and lender establishes contractual subrogation.” (quoting
Glassock v. Travellers Ins. Co., 113 S.W.2d 1005, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (applying
Texas law))); Wolf v. Spariosu, 706 So. 2d 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (applying
conventional subrogation where the refinancing lender had an express agreement with the
borrower to take the priority of the mortgages being paid); LaSalle Bank v. First Am. Bank,
736 N.E.2d 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (applying conventional subrogation primarily on the
basis of a provision in a construction loan agreement stating that the borrower was obligated to
provide a title insurance policy insuring that the construction mortgage was a first lien); Med
Ctr. Bank v. Fleetwood, 854 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Rock River Lumber
Corp. v. Universal Mortgage Corp. of Wis., 262 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Wis. 1978) (applying
conventional subrogation where the refinancing mortgage stated “the mortgagor hereby
covenants that the mortgagor is seized of a good title to the real estate in fee simple, free and
clear of all encumbrances”). Although numerous Louisiana cases apply conventional
subrogation, they are not considered here because of the unique features of Louisiana property
law. See also Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 25 P.3d 877, 882 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001)
(recognizing but rejecting the application of conventional subrogation and commenting, “[w]e
fail to see how the intention of [the refinancing lender] has anything to do with whether its
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subrogation is really a matter of enforcing a contract between the
refinancing lender and the borrower83—indeed, it is hard to see how
such a contract could possibly affect the intervening creditor’s rights.
A much more convincing explanation was provided by the Nebraska
Supreme Court in a conventional subrogation case many years ago:
It is not enough to entitle to subrogation that, with the proceeds of
[a new] mortgage, prior mortgages have been discharged. “The
real question in all such cases is whether the payment made by a
stranger was a loan to the debtor through a mere desire to aid him,
or whether it was made with the expectation of being substituted in
the place of a creditor. If the former is the case, he is not entitled to
subrogation; if the latter, he is.”84

When conventional subrogation is viewed in this light, it becomes
clear that the courts employing conventional subrogation are saying
precisely what the Restatement says: that subrogation should be
granted, irrespective of the subrogee’s knowledge of the intervening
lien when the subrogee “reasonably expected to receive a security
interest in the real estate with the priority of the mortgage being
discharged.”85 The agreement is simply evidence that the subrogee
had that expectation.
We need to examine the precise nature of the agreement that is
needed to trigger the doctrine of conventional subrogation. A recent
Illinois Court of Appeals case, Aames Capital Corp. v. Interstate
lien is a priority lien upon the property”); Wash. Mut. Bank v. Shorebank Corp., 703 N.W.2d
486 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing conventional subrogation but refusing to apply in the
absence of any evidence of an agreement giving the refinancing lender priority).
83. See 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 829 (“Subrogation in the last case is
sometimes called ‘conventional’ subrogation and is may [sic] be said to arise from contract, an
agreement between the subrogee and either the debtor or the creditor, although there is
serious doubt that its real basis is contractual. An agreement between the debtor and the
person claiming subrogation clearly does not in itself transfer the right of the creditor to such
person.”).
84. Bohn Sash & Door Co. v. Case, 60 N.W. 576, 581 (Neb. 1894) (quoting
Tradesmen’s Bldg. & C. Ass’n v. Thompson, 32 N.J. Eq. 133 (N.J. Ch. 1880)). A similar
point was made in Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 1139, 1152 (Utah 1936): “That equity
applies the doctrine of subrogation in [conventional subrogation] cases, not in exacting a
performance of the contract, but as a matter of doing justice under the circumstances; the socalled agreement only being of value showing such a situation where the doctrine should be
applied in order to do justice and as evidence that the lender was not a volunteer.” See also
Rock River Lumber, 262 N.W.2d at 117 (“Even where a definite agreement for subrogation is
shown, therefore, subrogation will be denied where it would lead to an uncontemplated and
inequitable result.”).
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) (1997).
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Bank of Oak Forest,86 is instructive. Aames involved a typical
refinancing: the new lender, Pacific Thrift & Loan Co., employed
the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform residential mortgage
form. After the mortgage documents were executed and recorded,
Pacific assigned them to Aames. The property was subject to a
recorded judgment lien in favor of Interstate Bank, which Pacific
apparently failed to discover. The court noted that the case might
have been decided on the basis of equitable subrogation, but because
Illinois authority on that doctrine was sparse, it preferred to use
conventional subrogation instead.
Since conventional subrogation requires an agreement between
the borrower and the new lender that the latter will “inherit” the
priority of the old mortgage, the court was forced to search the
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform mortgage to find such an
agreement. Unfortunately, no such express agreement exists in that
standardized document. The court was undaunted. It identified two
provisions that it felt suggested an intention for the refinancing
mortgagee to keep the priority of the paid-off mortgage. First, the
form states that the “[b]orrower shall promptly discharge any lien
which has priority over this Security Instrument.”87 Second, if the
borrower fails to perform this duty, the form states that the lender
can take any reasonable action to protect its rights.88
A fair reading of these provisions suggests that they are, at most,
a highly ambiguous statement of the refinancing lender’s expectation
to gain the priority of the mortgage it paid off. The court conceded
as much, but nevertheless stated:
[W]e believe that the above-referenced provisions, when read
together, indicate that the agreement of the parties was that the
mortgage held by Pacific would be a first priority mortgage, and

86. 734 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
87. Aames, 734 N.E.2d at 500; Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform
Single-Family
Instrument,
Form
3014
(Illinois),
January
2001,
¶
4,
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/3014-IllinoisMortgage.doc. Quotations in the
text are from the current version of the form, but it evidently does not vary materially from the
form reviewed by the court in Aames.
88. Freddie Mac, supra note 87, ¶ 9 (“Lender’s actions can include, but are not limited
to: (a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument . . . .
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of
Borrower secured by this Security Instrument.”).
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that any other prior mortgages of record would be paid off by
Pacific, with the new mortgage securing that debt.89

The holding in Aames is obviously a result-oriented stretching of
the mortgage’s language, but we agree with the result. The court’s
decision would have been easier had the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
form—used for a huge majority of U.S. residential mortgages—
contained an express provision like the following:
This Security Instrument is intended to create a first lien on the
Property. Borrower and Lender agree that this Security Instrument
shall have, and Lender intends and expects to have, the priority of
any other security instrument that has been paid or discharged with
the proceeds of the Loan secured by this Security Instrument.

Adding this language would make the application of conventional
subrogation almost irresistible, while costing nothing.90 Moreover, in
a jurisdiction following the Restatement approach to equitable
subrogation it would enormously solidify the conclusion that the
mortgagor “reasonably expected to receive a security interest in the
real estate with the priority of the mortgage being discharged.”91
While we do not consider such language essential to the application
of equitable subrogation, it seems only common sense to include it.
Such language provides no absolute guarantee that a court will apply
subrogation, but it strongly increases the likelihood.
B. Using the “Open-end” or Future Advances Clause
A second clause is designed to meet the problem of cash-out
refinancing, where the balance on the new loan exceeds the amount

89. Aames, 734 N.E.2d at 500. The court contrasted the refinancing mortgage before it
with the mortgage in Firstmark Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Bank, 649 N.E.2d 465
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995). In that case, the refinancing mortgage contained an express statement
that it was subject to the prior lien over which the mortgagee now sought priority; the court
refused to grant conventional subrogation.
90. We say “almost” because even a definite agreement is no guarantee of subrogation if
the result would be inequitable. See, for example, Rock River Lumber Corp. v. Universal
Mortgage Corp. of Wisconsin, 262 N.W.2d 114 (Wis. 1978), which points out that prejudice to
the intervening lienor might exist if a delay occurred between the recording of the satisfaction
of the original mortgage and the recording of the refinancing mortgage, and if the intervening
lienor extended credit during the period of delay in reliance on the apparently clear title of the
property at that time. Such a delay had occurred in Rock River, but the court found no reliance
on it by the intervening lienor, and granted conventional subrogation.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) (1997).
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paid to discharge the old loan.92 As we have already noted, there can
be no serious doubt that the additional sum advanced will prejudice
junior lienors, making subrogation against them unjust to that
extent.93 There is, however, a simple way to overcome this objection
to full subrogation in a cash-out refinancing: the use of a “future
advance” or “open-end mortgage” clause in the original mortgage.
From the 1950s through the 1980s, future advance clauses were
routinely used in residential mortgages.94 Such a clause might read as
follows:
Upon request of Borrower, Lender, at Lender’s option prior to
release of this Security Instrument, may make future advances to
Borrower. Such future advances, with interest thereon, shall be
secured by this Security Instrument when evidenced by promissory
notes stating that said notes are secured hereby. The maximum
principal amount of such future advances shall not exceed one-half
of the original amount secured by this Security Instrument.95
At no time shall the principal amount of the indebtedness secured
by this Instrument, not including sums advanced in accordance
herewith to protect the security of this Instrument, exceed the

92. Roughly half of all recent refinancings have involved this situation. See supra notes
47–51 and accompanying text.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 54–55. It is arguable that small amounts of cash
disbursed over and above the balance on the old mortgage should be disregarded and
subrogation ordered. The court did so in Union Planters Bank v. FT Mortgage Cos., 794
N.E.2d 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), stating that $4,000 of additional cash did not prevent
application of conventional subrogation.
94. Such clauses were included in standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac mortgage forms
when they were developed in the 1970s. See, e.g., D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., Nonuniform
Covenant 20 of the District of Columbia FNMA/FHLMC Single Family Deed of Trust Form,
LAW OF FED. MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS app. a (1989). Use of future advance clauses was
apparently discontinued in those forms in the early 1990s. This was confirmed by a
conversation of one of the coauthors with John Mansfield, Vice President and Deputy General
Counsel, Federal National Mortgage Association, September 9, 1994.
95. The language is derived from the clause quoted in In re Hawkins, 156 B.R. 745
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1993). We have modified it to be consistent with the terminology of the
current Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform one-to-four-family mortgage instrument. For
similar illustrations, see Hill v. Delta Loan & Finance Co., 277 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Ark. 1955);
Downing v. First National Bank, 81 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1955). Note that this clause
contemplates that the additional advance will refer specifically to the original mortgage and,
therefore, differs from a “dragnet” clause, which typically provides that the mortgage will
secure “any other indebtedness that may be owed to lender by borrower.” See 1 NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 12.7, for an extended discussion of dragnet clauses.
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original amount of the Note (US$___________) plus the additional
sum of US$____________.96

The priority of advances under this sort of clause has traditionally
depended on whether the advances were optional or obligatory. The
traditional rule held that unless the lender had a contractual duty to
make the future advance, it would lose priority to any intervening
liens that the lender had notice of when the advance was made.97
This rule would render the future advance clause useless in
preserving the priority of the full mortgage balance in a cash-out
refinancing, which by its nature involves the making of an optional
and discretionary advance.
However, the advent of statutory changes in a large number of
jurisdictions and the teaching of the Restatement on this issue have
caused a major change in the legal attitude toward the priority of
future advances. The Restatement takes the view that all future
advances should be granted the priority of the original mortgage but
permits the borrower to issue a “cut-off notice” to the lender,
terminating the borrower’s right to any additional advances.98 Under
the Restatement, so long as the lender has not received a cut-off
notice, it can be confident that all of the advances it makes will carry
the original mortgage’s priority.
Changes in the law along similar lines have become quite
pervasive, mainly because of statutory changes during the past
twenty-five years. The Restatement contains a statutory table

96. The final sentence appeared in the “nonuniform covenants” of the Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac form in a number of jurisdictions; it was inserted to comply with individual
state statutes requiring a statement in the mortgage of the maximum amount of principal to be
secured. An illustrative clause appeared as Nonuniform Covenant 33 of the Texas
FNMA/FHLMC Multifamily Deed of Trust form, reprinted in GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 14.16, cl. 33 (3d ed. 1993).
97. See, e.g., Model Home Bldg., Inc. v. Turnquist, 102 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1960)
(refusing to accord priority to the advances because they were optional, without reference to
senior lender’s notice of junior liens); S. Trust Mortgage Co. v. K & B Door Co., 763 P.2d
353 (Nev. 1988) (granting obligatory advances priority over intervening mechanic’s liens);
Colonial Bank v. Marine Bank, 448 N.W.2d 659 (Wis. 1989) (refusing to recognize priority of
optional advances made at a time when senior lender had actual knowledge of junior liens). On
the complex question of whether, and what sort of, notice of junior liens to the senior lender
will cause the senior lender to lose priority, see Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman,
Rethinking Future Advance Mortgages: A Brief for the Restatement Approach, 44 DUKE L.J.
657, 680–82 (1995).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 2.3 (1997).
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summarizing the priority of future advances in all fifty states.99 In
thirty-five states, even an optional future advance will ordinarily
retain priority. In sixteen of these states, the borrower is empowered
to send a cut-off notice terminating further advances, and any
advances made thereafter will lose priority. In another eleven states,
the lender will lose priority for advances made after the lender
receives written notice of the presence of any intervening lien.100
These notice procedures should cause no risk to lenders; in the
relatively rare case in which a senior lender receives a cut-off notice
or notice of the existence of a junior lien, the senior lender would
simply place the notice in the loan file to warn that the senior lender
could not safely make any additional advances. Since the original
mortgage’s priority continues to govern under these statutes, no title
examination or new title insurance would be necessary.
Of the thirty-five states listed in the Restatement as protecting
the priority of future advances, twenty-eight also require a statement
of maximum principal amount, either to ensure the priority of the
advance or to establish its validity as a secured claim.101 For this
reason, a provision like the second sentence of the clause in the
indented quotation above is essential in those states. Once again, this
is not a burdensome requirement. The lender might, for example, set
the maximum total amount at roughly fifty percent above the
amount of the original loan. This would be more than sufficient for
the vast majority of refinancings.102
On its face the future advances clause enables the borrower to
refinance, without the expense of a title examination and title
insurance, with the same lender that made the original mortgage
loan. However, for a variety of reasons, the borrower may wish to
99. Id. § 2.1 statutory note.
100. Id. Some of the statutes listed also require recording of the notice. Those requiring
recording also require direct notice to the senior mortgagee, thus eliminating any concern that
a title examination by the mortgagee would be necessary prior to the making of the additional
advance. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-2 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 697.04(1)(b) (2005); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 436(1)(A), (2) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238.01(1) (2005);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-72(a) (2005) (document to be recorded must be requested from
mortgagee); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5301.232(C) (West 2005).
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 2.1 statutory note.
102. Based on the data collected by the Federal Reserve Board on cash-out refinancings
in 2001–2002, the average additional amount of cash taken was only about twenty-one
percent of the current loan balance (and hence, an even smaller percentage of the original loan
balance, which would have been paid down somewhat by monthly amortization payments). See
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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obtain the refinancing from a different lender—one who is offering
more attractive loan terms, for example. The subrogation doctrine
that we advance allows the refinancing lender to take advantage of a
future advance clause in the original mortgage. Subrogation, after all,
is nothing more than an assignment of the original mortgage to the
refinancing lender by operation of law.103 Hence, the refinancing
lender’s rights should not be materially different than if it had
acquired the original mortgage by a literal, written assignment.104
While we have found no case directly raising this issue, courts in
other contexts have readily permitted mortgage assignees to benefit
from clauses in the original mortgages.105 Ordinarily, of course,
subrogation is applicable only to the extent that the proceeds of the
refinance loan are applied to pay the original loan.106 But if the
benefit of the future advance clause is available to the new lender,
the limitations of the subrogation theory for cash-out refinancing
simply disappear in all cases in which the original mortgage contains
an appropriate future advance clause. Any intervening lienors can
hardly complain since they knew of the risk of being subjected to a
larger prior lien by the recorded future advance clause.107 That risk is

103. See G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 657 A.2d 1170, 1179 (Md.
1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. a.
104. It seems obvious that a mortgage investor taking an assignment of a note and
mortgage containing a future advance clause would be permitted to make advances under the
clause and have the benefit of the priority that would have been available to the original
mortgagee. See Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667 (La. 1984), in which a
bank taking an assignment of a mortgage and subsequently making additional advances made
this argument. The court rejected the argument on the ground that the original loan
agreement did not sufficiently reflect an intention that future advances would be covered by
the mortgage, but appeared to agree that if the agreement had been sufficient, the advances by
the assignee would have been entitled to priority under Louisiana law. Id. at 672–73.
105. See Ala.-Fla. Co. v. Mays, 149 So. 61, 64 (Fla. 1933) (“The general rule is that the
assignee of a mortgage is invested with the powers and interests of the mortgagee as fully as if
he had been named such in the mortgage.”); Money Store Inv. Corp. v. Summers, 822
N.E.2d 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (Transfer Granted, Opinion Vacated, IN RAP 58(A))
(permitting assignee of mortgage to exercise rights under mortgage’s dragnet clause); In re
McCurdy’s Estate, 154 A. 707 (Pa. 1931) (same).
106. See, e.g., Union Planters Bank v. FT Mortgage Cos., 794 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2003) (permitting a subrogated refinancing lender to gain priority despite a small increase
in the loan balance).
107. See Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 485 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
(“[B]ecause the [intervening lienors] were aware of the future advance clause, they had notice
that their claims would be subordinate to any liens falling within the purview of the [senior
mortgage].”).
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not materially different if the additional advance is made by a
different lender rather than by the original lender.
In sum, the two clauses discussed above have the potential to
eliminate virtually all of the problematic aspects of equitable
subrogation as applied to mortgage refinancings. The clause
expressing the refinancing lender’s intent to acquire the priority of
the mortgage being paid off will, under the conventional
subrogation concept, ensure that the courts are not burdened by
debates about the refinancing lender’s notice or knowledge of
intervening liens. The clause providing for future advances will give
the refinancing lender the ability to provide cash out without worry
about loss of priority for the additional cash. Both clauses are
essentially free; they involve no cost beyond a slight rewording of
existing mortgage forms.
C. Expanding Subrogation to New Debtors
Once the notion is accepted, as outlined above, that a mortgage
lien may extend through more than one financing of a given debtor’s
property, the question arises whether it may extend to more than
one debtor. Consider a case in which an original mortgage,
containing a future advance clause and appropriate “conventional”
subrogation language (if necessary to actuate subrogation under
applicable state law), is assumed by a new owner of the real estate. It
would be highly desirable if the mortgage lien—enlarged as necessary
to meet the financial needs of the new owner of the property but
only within the limitations imposed by the future advance clause—
could continue to secure the new owner’s purchase-money debt.
However, it is standard doctrine that subrogation is assumed to
apply only to debts incurred by the original debtor.
The necessity for such a “warning” may be somewhat overblown in any event. In the
analogous situation involving personal property security under article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, subordinate lienors lose priority to future advances made under an
appropriate clause in the senior security agreement, even though the security agreement itself is
not a matter of public record (since only a financing statement, and not the entire security
agreement, need be filed). In effect, all subordinate lienors of personal property security must
accept the risk that a future advance clause in the senior security agreement will impair their
position. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2000) (generally requiring filing for perfection of a security
interest); id. § 9-323 (generally giving all future advances the priority of the original security
agreement); id. § 9-323 cmt. 3 (stating that if a financing statement has been filed, “it is
abundantly clear that the time when an advance is made plays no role in determining priorities
among conflicting security interests”).
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This assumption is well illustrated by the Alabama Court of Civil
Appeals’ opinion in Collateral Investment Co. v. Pilgrim.108 A
developer, Cameron, built a townhouse project with funds lent by
Central Bank on the security of a construction mortgage.109
Cameron failed to pay Pilgrim, a supplier of electrical equipment, for
the project, giving Pilgrim the right to file a materialman’s lien.110
However, before the lien was filed, Cameron sold two of the houses
to Burleson and Hatfield, who borrowed mortgage funds from
Collateral to finance their purchases.111 Pilgrim filed its lien after
these sales were consummated.112 Collateral attempted to gain
priority over the lien by asserting a right of subrogation to the
construction loan, which clearly would have had priority over the
lien and which had been paid off pro-rata with the funds lent by
Collateral.113 However, the court rejected Collateral’s assertions:114
We cannot find in the present case that the money was advanced at
the instance of the debtor to satisfy the prior incumbrance [sic].
The debtor to Central was Cameron. Collateral’s debtors were
Burleson and Hatfield. Burleson and Hatfield were not debtors of
Central. Therefore Burleson and Hatfield had no obligation to
Central. Although it is clear that Collateral paid this debt to
Central in order to satisfy the encumbrance, this was not done at
the instance of Cameron. . . . Collateral argues that it advanced
money for the express purpose of satisfying this prior encumbrance.
However, we cannot agree. Collateral loaned this money to the
individuals based on these individuals’ credit. The money was not
loaned for the express purpose of satisfying this prior
encumbrance.115

Clearly, the Alabama court’s assumption was that only a request
by the original debtor for a payment of the debt will result in
subrogation. Yet there seems to be no particular reason to make this
assumption, and the statements of the subrogation principle made by

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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most courts do not intrinsically embody it.116 We must concede that
cases in which subrogation has actually been applied after a transfer
of the property or a substitution of debtors are rare indeed. We are
aware of only one in which the issue was seriously considered: East
Boston Savings Bank v. Ogan.117 There, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court adopted the broad, “no-fault” Restatement view of
subrogation. The decision clearly reflects the court’s understanding
that it was doing something a bit unusual118 in applying subrogation
to a case in which the property had been sold at the time of the new
financing:
Because we find that the equities are substantially similar in
refinancing and sales transactions, and that application of equitable
subrogation to a sale is consistent with our precedent, we hold that
equitable subrogation applies in this case.
....
. . . [T]he distinction between a sale and a refinancing exists, but
subrogation arising out of either context yields the same result.119

The Massachusetts court’s understanding is correct. Moreover, if
widely applied, and if used with mortgage documents containing
appropriate future advance clauses, that understanding would have
the potential to eliminate the need for lenders’ title insurance
coverage in a vast additional class of cases involving new purchasemoney financing of real estate sales. At the same time, adoption of
the principle would earn the undying enmity of the title insurance
industry, depriving it of a major source of its revenue. Of course, the
need for title insurance would not be wholly eliminated in sale
transactions since the purchaser of the property (who, not being a
lender, would be ineligible for subrogation) would still need
assurance that she or he is obtaining title of an acceptable quality.
116. Perhaps presciently, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4)
(1997) does not make this assumption. It makes subrogation appropriate if the refinancing
lender pays the original mortgage debt “upon a request from the obligor or the obligor’s
successor to do so.” Id. (emphasis added).
117. 701 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1998). The court applied subrogation to benefit a lender
making a loan to the purchasers of the property in National City Mortgage Co. v. Ross, 117
P.3d 880 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005). However, there is no indication in the opinion that the court
realized it was doing anything novel.
118. The court cited no authority outside of Massachusetts for its action. Id.
119. Id. at 334–36.
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We do not advocate here the application of subrogation to
mortgages on properties that have been sold to new owners. Case
authority supporting it is extremely limited, and it lies outside the
ordinary scope of the subrogation doctrine. Perhaps the notion is
too radical, portending too great a change in established,
conventional practices in real estate sales. Or perhaps its time is
simply yet to come. We present it merely to illustrate the potential
power of the subrogation doctrine, and to suggest that a modest
amount of creative thinking about the priority of mortgages might
result in the saving of a great deal of money. Even without applying
subrogation to properties whose title is being transferred, the two
clauses described in this section—the clause expressing the lender’s
intent to have the prior mortgage’s priority120 and the clause
providing for future advances121—can enormously solidify the legal
foundation for the subrogation concept, and hence can vastly reduce
the need for new title protection when refinancings occur.
V. IS THERE A REMAINING ROLE FOR TITLE
INSURANCE IN REFINANCING?
It is clear that at present, the primary role of title examination
and title insurance in the context of a mortgage refinancing is to
ensure that there are no intervening liens or other interests in the
property that might gain priority over the new mortgage. As the
courts adopt the concept of subrogation we advocate, this function
will become unnecessary. Hence, we consider here whether title
insurance provides any other “value added” to refinancing lenders
sufficient to justify their continued insistence that borrowers
purchase it.
A. Protective Functions of Title Insurance
In addition to insuring against intervening liens, title insurance
provides certain other protections to a refinancing mortgage lender.
One clear advantage of title insurance is that it, in effect, guarantees
the authenticity of the borrowers’ signatures on the refinancing
documents—the promissory note and the mortgage or other security

120. See supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 92–107 and accompanying text.
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instrument.122 This is insurance against forgery, and forgery is hardly
unknown among mortgage borrowers.123 Various forms of incapacity
of the borrowers—infancy, insanity, duress, and the like—are also
insured against.124 However, if the doctrine of subrogation is
otherwise available, it will almost certainly solve these problems as
well as the problem of the intervening lien. Subrogation, after all,
does not require that the refinancing lender in fact have a valid
mortgage, but only that the refinancing lender have paid off the old
loan with the expectation of having a valid (and prior) mortgage.
Hence, if the new mortgage is a forgery, is granted without capacity,
or its execution is defective in some other way, the refinancing lender
is still entitled to the validity (and priority) of the old mortgage.125
The new lender may still be at risk with respect to any “cash out”
unless the old mortgage contains a future advances clause,126 but its
concern about mortgage defects is obviously greatly mitigated by
subrogation. Hence, the absence of title insurance would be far less
significant than it might first appear.
A similar issue arises if a mortgage is given by a person currently
in bankruptcy. Because the bankrupt debtor’s estate is entirely under
the control of the trustee in bankruptcy or debtor in possession, any
transfer is subject to approval by the bankruptcy court, and a
mortgage given without court approval is voidable.127 Once again,

122. See American Land Title Ass’n, Questions About Title Insurance,
http://www.alta.org/consumer/questions.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
123. See id.; see also Brant v. Hargrove, 632 P.2d 978 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (wife’s
signature forged on mortgage given by husband); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hardisty, 646
N.E.2d 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (husband’s signature on mortgage given by wife); Bank One
v. Koch, 649 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (signature on mortgage of one tenant in
common forged by the other tenant in common).
124. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Inter-County Title Guar. & Mortgage Co., 213 So. 2d 518 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (mortgage from corporation improperly executed by officers in their
personal capacities); Narbeth Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 190 A. 149 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1937) (individual spouse alone lacked authority to transfer any interest in property
held in tenancy by the entirety).
125. See Union-Davenport Trust & Sav. Bank v. Lyons, 212 N.W. 380 (Iowa 1927)
(holding that even if mortgage signatures were forged, refinancing lender obtained a valid lien
by subrogation); see also Kuske v. Staley, 28 P.2d 728 (Kan. 1934); Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n
v. Woodbury, 679 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y v.
McFadden, 72 P.2d 795 (Okla. 1937).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 92–107.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (2000). If the bankruptcy petition was filed involuntarily, the
transfer is not voidable unless made after an order of relief is entered. Id. § 549(b). Interests in
property transferred to bona fide purchasers are not voidable. Id. § 549(c). However, to
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however, subrogation would almost certainly give the refinancing
lender great, if not total, protection if the original mortgage had
been recorded prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.128
Even if subrogation did not insulate refinancing lenders against
the risks described above, those risks are rarely significant, and
lenders might well decide simply to absorb them rather than impose
the costs of new title insurance policies on their customers. After all,
banks and other institutional lenders accept many other sorts of loan
documents from borrowers without any insurance of their validity.
Examples include unsecured promissory notes, security agreements
based on personal property collateral, and modifications of existing
mortgage loan agreements. Lenders typically do nothing to
corroborate the authenticity of these documents or the signatures on
them beyond asking to see a government-issued photo identification
and, perhaps, including a statement in the loan application that the
borrower has not filed and will not file bankruptcy. These risks are
not covered by title insurance,129 but they are simply not thought
great enough to warrant particular concern.
A second advantage of title insurance is its coverage of what
might be called the “delayed recording gap.” The issue arises
because the old lender in a refinancing transaction is rarely willing to
provide a recordable discharge of its mortgage until after (sometimes
several weeks or months after) it receives its payoff. During this
“gap” period there is, at least conceptually, some risk that the old
lender will refuse or fail to provide a discharge, perhaps taking the
position that the payoff amount is inadequate (despite the fact that it
is invariably based on a written payoff statement supplied by the old
lender). A number of statutes, including the newly promulgated
Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act, attempt to mitigate
this risk by use of a variety of measures, including: obligating paidqualify as a bona fide purchaser, the refinancing lender would need to perform a title
examination, thus defeating the objective we seek here. See In re McConville, 110 F.3d 47
(9th Cir. 1997) (The parties stipulated that the lender was a bona fide purchaser, but the court
seemed unconvinced; it recognized the lender as having a lien to recover the principal amount
of its loan, but no more.).
128. See In re Halabi, 184 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (original mortgage was recorded
prior to filing of bankruptcy; secondary market investor who took assignment of mortgage
after bankruptcy filing was protected by original mortgage priority as against bankruptcy’s
trustee’s “strong-arm” powers).
129. See, e.g., Bank of Miami Beach v. Lawyers Title Guar. Fund, 214 So. 2d 95 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (title insurance does not protect lender from forgery of promissory note).
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off lenders to issue discharges;130 imposing damages liability and
penalties on lenders who fail to do so;131 making payoff statements
binding on those who reasonably and detrimentally rely on them;132
and as a last resort, permitting title insurance companies or other
settlement agents to record a discharge if the lender has failed to do
so despite ample notice.133 But these measures are not perfect and
disputes still arise between old and new lenders as to whether the
payoff amount was proper. Fortunately, the amount disputed is
typically small134 and, in the vast majority of cases, is probably
resolved without a claim on the title insurance carrier, much less any
litigation. Hence, the absence of the theoretical protection of title
insurance is unlikely to be thought significant by refinancing lenders.
A third value of title insurance is the insurance underwriter’s
obligation to pay the expense of litigation involving the refinancing
lender’s title to the mortgaged property. This is a widely touted

130. Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act § 201 (2004). For a brief
description of the state statutes, see 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 6.6 nn.31–36
and accompanying text. The duty to provide a discharge exists as a matter of common law as
well. See id. § 6.6 n.28; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 6.4(b) (1997).
131. Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act § 203.
132. Id. § 202. Under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.6(c) a lender
issuing a payoff statement “may be estopped to deny its accuracy as against one who has
reasonably and detrimentally relied on” it. However, lenders often litter their payoff statements
with disclaimers (e.g., “this statement is subject to final reconciliation by the issuer”), the effect
of which is uncertain. See Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act § 201 cmt. 7.
133. Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act §§ 301–306.
134. Based on discussions held during the drafting of the Uniform Residential Mortgage
Satisfaction Act, two types of disputes commonly arise. In one situation, the borrower has paid,
and the lender has credited to the borrower’s account, a regular monthly payment received by
check shortly before the payoff statement is issued. A few days later, the check is dishonored by
the drawee bank and the lender adds its amount to the original payoff figure. However, the
refinance closing may already have occurred by this time, based on the original figure.
The second situation involves expenditures made by, or on behalf of, the original lender
shortly before the issuance of the payoff statement is issued for such items as inspections to the
property, payment of expenses to preserve the property, attorneys’ fees involved in attempting
to collect a delinquency, or the like. If the lender does not receive a bill for such services until
after the payoff statement is issued, it will want to add their amounts to the original payoff
figure. Again, the refinance closing may already have occurred by this time.
The amounts involved in these disputes are likely to be relatively small: a few hundred,
or at most, a few thousand dollars. Moreover, the original lender can ordinarily prove
convincingly that the additional money is owed. Interview with Professor R. Wilson
Freyermuth, Reporter, Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act, in Columbia, Mo. (July
7, 2005). Hence, there is little point in attempting to shift this sort of loss to a title insurer.
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benefit of all title insurance,135 although perhaps it amounts to a bit
less than it appears since it is not uncommon for a title insurer to
refuse to defend the insured’s title, leading to litigation between the
insured and the insurer.136 Nonetheless, the value of the insurer’s
obligation to defend the title cannot be discounted. At least in
jurisdictions in which the reach of the subrogation doctrine is
uncertain or is readily contested, there is clear value to lenders in
having someone else pay the costs of the contest.
However, if we are correct that a new and broader concept of
subrogation is gaining ground, the need for litigation will surely
diminish as that process proceeds. Obviously, litigation can arise in
any dispute, but lenders do not think it essential to be insured for
litigation costs in the general run of consumer or commercial loan
transactions in which they engage. Once the lender’s risk of loss of
lien priority is eliminated by the application of a more modern
concept of subrogation, it is unlikely that the remaining risks of
litigation will be considered worth insuring against.
Title insurance agents often perform one additional service in
mortgage refinancing that is not intrinsically related to the insuring
function: they handle the settlement or closing. This involves
obtaining a payoff figure from the existing mortgagee, preparing or
procuring preparation of the necessary documents, obtaining the
parties’ signatures, recording the new mortgage and the satisfaction
of the old mortgage, and disbursing the funds from the new loan to
those entitled to receive them. Whether it makes sense for a lender
to “farm out” these functions is highly debatable in cases in which
the settlement agent is not also performing a title examination and

135. “The Loan Policy guarantees the lender a valid and enforceable lien, and assures that
no claimant other than those noted in the policy has a prior claim against the real estate. The
policy assures that the purchaser-borrower has title to the property being pledged as security
for the loan. And, the policy obligates the title insurer to pay for defending against any claim
filed against the title that might supersede the lender’s lien. If unsuccessful, it must also satisfy
that claim should it be upheld in court.” American Land Title Ass’n, Title Insurance: A
Comprehensive
Overview
6,
available
at
http://www.alta.org/press/
TitleInsuranceOverview.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
136. See JOYCE D. PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE § 11:3 (Release 3, August 2005). If the
insured prevails in such a suit, the insurer will usually be liable for the attorneys’ fees and
litigation expenses incurred by the insured in defending its own title. Id. § 10.4(5) nn.15–21.
However, that can be a long road, surely not one likely to be taken unless the amount involved
is very substantial.
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issuing title insurance.137 For small, low-volume lenders, the
delegation of these duties to a separate settlement agent may well be
efficient, avoiding the necessity of training and paying in-house
personnel whose time would be divided between these and other
functions. For larger lenders, whose volume is sufficient to keep inhouse staff busy, it is likely that when title insurance is no longer
necessary, the settlement function will be brought back into the
lender’s organization.138 Whether to continue to outsource
settlement services—to title insurance agents, to independent escrow

137. Outsourcing the settlement function has the advantage of placing it in the hands of
personnel who are presumably well trained and skilled in the process, but it has the
disadvantage of requiring the movement of large volumes of paper between the lender and the
settlement provider, with the attendant risks of miscommunication and lost documents.
138. Both of the present authors well recall their early days of law practice in the 1960s in
Minneapolis and Los Angeles, when it was commonplace for lenders to handle their own
closings.
In 2002, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a proposed
regulation that would have amended HUD’s interpretation of the Federal Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (2000). See 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134 (July 29,
2002). The proposal (which was never made final) would have introduced the concept of the
Guaranteed Mortgage Package Agreement (GMPA), under which mortgage lenders would
have been permitted to provide a wide variety of settlement services, include the lender’s title
insurance costs, into a single fee to be charged to the borrower. Such a fee would have been
readily comparable among lenders, unlike the plethora of fees and charges often imposed at
present. This would, HUD believed, have led to greater price competition and ultimately to
the driving down of settlement costs for consumers. The proposal was greeted warmly by
larger lenders, but met with squeals of pain from the title insurance industry and a variety of
other providers of settlement services. Consumer groups generally welcomed it, although they
complained that it did nothing to resolve the problems of predatory lending. See Sheldon E.
Hochberg, HUD’s RESPA Regulations: The Proposals, the Comments, the Future, TITLE NEWS,
Jan.–Feb. 2003, available at http://www.alta.org/publications/titlenews/03/01_01.cfm.
The proposal was similar to one made by one of the present authors eighteen years earlier. See
Dale A. Whitman, Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 62 GEO. L.J. 1311,
1346–60 (1974).
HUD predicted that lenders who offered GMPAs would have an incentive to bargain
down their costs of loan origination, either by negotiating more favorable contracts with
existing suppliers of settlement services or by bringing the services in-house. See HUD,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS FOR RESPA
PROPOSED RULE TO SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING MORTGAGES TO
REDUCE SETTLEMENT COSTS TO CONSUMERS
(July
2002),
available at
http://www.compliancetimes.org/pdfs/ea-chapters.pdf. Since title examination is the element
of settlement services requiring the greatest technical expertise, if that function were no longer
necessary it is even more likely that larger lenders would internalize the remaining functions.
The HUD GMPA concept is not dead but is certainly severely wounded at this writing,
two years after it was proposed. See 70 Fed. Reg. 37,646 (June 29, 2005) (HUD
announcement of a series of roundtable discussions to consider how its RESPA reform
proposals might be recast).
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companies, or to other types of entities—is a matter of business
judgment that each lender will need to answer.139 But as the
subrogation doctrine evolves and title insurance becomes
increasingly unnecessary, it is clear that the net cost of the
refinancing transaction will be decreased, regardless of who handles
the settlement.
B. Informational Functions of Title Insurance
One function currently served by title insurers in mortgage
refinancing will remain essential even if a broad view of subrogation
is widely adopted. The refinancing lender or its settlement agent
must have some mechanism for determining what lender holds the
existing first mortgage simply because it is necessary to (1) obtain a
payoff statement from that lender, (2) transmit the payoff funds to it,
and (3) obtain from it a recordable discharge of the old mortgage.140
None of these acts can occur until the holder of the original
mortgage is identified. Presently, title insurance companies or agents
ordinarily perform this service and provide the information to the
lender or its settlement agent in a title insurance binder, preliminary
title report, or other similar document.
Fortunately, title insurance is not the only way for refinancing
lenders to gain the needed information. One alternative for the
refinancing lender is to ask the mortgagor to present the existing
title insurance policy that was issued when the property was acquired
or previously refinanced. Mortgagors might be asked to provide,
along with the title policy, a brief affidavit that states that the policy
presented accurately represents the current holder of the first
mortgage and perhaps a photocopy of their payment book, billing
statement, or other recent correspondence from the current
mortgage servicer.141 The refinancing lender would then verify the
information by requesting a payoff statement from the servicer.142
139. This discretion is fettered in some jurisdictions by rules governing the unauthorized
practices of law. See, e.g., Bishop v. Jefferson Title Co., 28 P.3d 802 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(employee of escrow company engaged in unauthorized practice of law).
140. This process is aptly described in Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act,
Prefatory Note (2004).
141. These items would alert the refinancing lender to any change in servicing that might
have occurred after recordation of the existing mortgage. “Servicing” refers to the processes of
collecting loan payments, maintaining any escrow accounts for taxes and insurance, paying
those items out of the relevant escrow accounts, making collection efforts if a payment default
occurs, and, if necessary, foreclosing the mortgage. In modern mortgage practice, servicing is
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A second alternative method for the refinancing lender to learn
the identity of the existing mortgagee is the use of one of several
Internet-based services providing basic title information. Some of
these services are operated by title insurers143 and others by
independent businesses.144 Their cost is extremely modest in
comparison with conventional title insurance policies.145
Yet a third alternative for the refinancing lender that is rapidly
becoming more readily available is to check the public records
directly on the Internet.146 An increasing number of public recorders’
offices have made their records directly searchable online, and many
more are certain to do so in the near future.147 The recent adoption
of the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act148 by the
often divorced from the holding of the loan and is carried out by a different entity than the
holder. The servicer is an agent of the mortgage holder for purposes of carrying out the
functions indicated above. See generally Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market—
A Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L.J. 991 (1986) (discussing the
development of the modern secondary mortgage market).
142. In theory, if a payoff were erroneously made to the original mortgagee after the
mortgage had been assigned on the secondary market (with a corresponding change of
servicing), the refinancing lender making the payoff could be liable to pay a second time. See
Dale A. Whitman, Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as a Paradigm, 1998 BYU L. REV.
1169, 1171. This risk is eliminated for non-negotiable promissory notes by RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.5 (1997). In all events, it arises mainly with individual
lenders, and is a risk of minuscule proportions when institutional first mortgage lenders are
involved. Whitman, supra, at 1197.
143. See, e.g., RealQuest, operated by First American Real Estate Solutions,
http://firstamres.com/products/realquest.jsp?CMP=KNC-GOOG (last visited Jan. 30,
2006);
Land
Records,
operated
by
Fidelity
National
Title
Ins.
Co.,
https://www.fntic.com/services/l_records.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
144. See,
e.g.,
HomeInfoMax,
http://www.homeinfomax.com/Real_Property_Records.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
145. For example, “Title and Vesting” reports from RealQuest, supra note 143, are $20
each with a $300 monthly purchase commitment by the subscriber, or $25 each with no
commitment. Detailed reports from HomeInfoMax, supra note 144, are about the same price.
146. See Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic
Recording Act, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245 (2002); Dale A. Whitman, Digital Recording of
Real Estate Documents, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 227 (1999).
147. See PROPERTY RECORDS INDUSTRY ASS’N, URPERA ENACTMENT AND
ERECORDING STANDARDS IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE (Draft 1.3, 2005) (on file with author)
(indicating that forty-eight counties or other local jurisdictions had adopted electronic
recording procedures by 2004). Nearly all of these counties’ procedures provide for online
viewing of recorded documents, as do many other recorders that are not yet accepting
electronic recording.
148. The Act was approved by the Conference in August 2004. The NCCUSL website
indicates that at the time of this writing it has been introduced in seven jurisdictions and
enacted in five: Arizona, Delaware, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, and Texas. See
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will
facilitate this movement’s growth. Determining the identity of the
lender holding the existing first mortgage on a residential property is
a simple task under most of these online records systems.
In sum, the advantages of title insurance to refinancing lenders—
apart from assurance against loss of lien priority—are marginal at
best. If the Restatement’s approach to mortgage refinancing is
widely adopted, title insurance may or may not continue to be used
by refinancing lenders. If it continues to play a role, its benefits will
be far less significant than in the past, and its cost should be reduced
commensurately.
VI. DIRECT ASSIGNMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SUBROGATION
Our discussion thus far has focused on the doctrine of
subrogation as a means of reducing the reliance of refinancing
lenders on title insurance. However, there is an alternative to the
subrogation doctrine for passing on the priority of the old mortgage
to the refinancing lender: a direct, written assignment of the old
mortgage to the new lender. If a widespread practice of giving such
assignments were established, it would have the same effect as
subrogation, but without the quibbles about notice of, and prejudice
to, intervening lienors discussed above.149 After such an assignment,
the refinancing lender could amend the promissory note (and the
mortgage if necessary) to reflect the change in the loan’s terms—
typically a lower interest rate. Since neither the assignment nor the
lowering of the interest rate150 would impair the mortgage’s priority,
the refinancing lender’s retention of the original priority against
intervening lienors would be assured.
However, so far as we know, the granting of an assignment by
the old lender to the refinancing lender is a common practice only in
the state of New York. Oddly, the New York practice of assigning
mortgages to be refinanced was not established as a way of ensuring
the priority of the new lender’s position but as a way of avoiding the
state’s extremely burdensome mortgage recording tax.151 No one
http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-urpera.asp (last visited
Jan. 30, 2006).
149. See supra notes 37–43, 46–67 and accompanying text.
150. See supra text accompanying note 55.
151. The recording tax is assessed on a complex schedule and depends on the amount of
the mortgage, whether the property is a one-to-two-family residence and whether the property
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ever seems to have considered assignment as a way to preserve the
original mortgage’s priority and thereby avoid the necessity of a new
title examination or new title insurance.
Refinancings (as well as financings for real estate sales) are often
handled in New York by use of a “Consolidation, Extension, and
Modification Agreement” (“CEM”), which serves both to assign the
mortgage and to restate its terms as necessary.152 While New York
lenders whose loans are being paid off have no legal obligation to
facilitate this sort of transaction153 unless the terms of their
mortgages require them to do so, many cooperate voluntarily, but
only if they receive a fee—usually in the range of $200 to $1000
with a median of perhaps $600.154
is located in New York City, Yonkers, or other parts of the state. In the worst case, for
nonresidential properties within New York City, the tax is 2.75% of the mortgage amount.
Even for one-to-two-family residential properties with mortgages under $500,000 in New
York City, the tax is 2% of the mortgage amount, less $25. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 253
(McKinney 2005). The mortgagee pays 0.25% of the tax, and the remainder is paid by the
mortgagor. Id. at 1-a(a). The schedule is set out graphically in a convenient form at
http://www.empireabstract.com/taxinfo.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006). The rationale for
use of the assignment as a mortgage tax avoidance device is spelled out in Petition No.
M991230A, New York Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, Advisory Opinion (Feb. 25,
2000),
available
at
http://www.tax.state.ny.us/pdf/advisory_opinions/mortgage/
a00_1r.pdf.
152. The rationale for the form is explained at http://www.freddiemac.com/cim/pdf/
nycemaqa.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). The text of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac-approved
CEM
form
appears
at
http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/
specialpurpose/pdf/3172.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). The form provided by the New York
Board of Title Underwriters appears at http://www22.inetba.com/newyorktitle/filecabinet/
Consolidation_Extension.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
153. An earlier New York statute, former N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 275, captioned
“Assignment of mortgage required in lieu of certificate or discharge,” enacted by Chapter 408
of the Laws of 1914, required lenders to execute such assignments. However, it was repealed
by Chapter 241, Laws of 1989. See Michael J. Berey, Legislation Addresses Mortgage, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 24, 1998, at S6.
It is quite arguable that when a mortgage loan is paid in full by someone who is not
primarily responsible for payment, the payor is entitled to an assignment as a matter of law. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. a (1997); see also Payne v. Foster,
135 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954) (payment by holder of remainder); Simonson v.
Lauck, 93 N.Y.S. 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905) (payment by a third party at the request of a
tenant in common of the real estate); Global Realty Corp. v. Charles Kannel Corp., 170
N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (payment by junior tenant). However, none of the
authorities cited recognize any corresponding right when payment is made by the mortgagor
rather than a third party.
154. Cooperation is more likely between institutional lenders since their mortgage forms
are likely to be mutually acceptable. With respect to the amount of the fee, see Hillary
Potashnick, Mortgages and Co-op Loans, RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS & CLOSINGS
2004, 140; PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE NEW YORK PRACTICE SKILLS COURSE HANDBOOK
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On its face, this New York practice should make a new title
insurance policy entirely unnecessary when a mortgage loan is
refinanced, at least if the loan balance is not increased. It is, after all,
the same mortgage with the same priority as when it was originated,
and the title insurance protection runs with the mortgage.155
Nonetheless, refinancing lenders in New York typically insist on a
new title insurance policy even when the old mortgage is assigned to
them. If the loan balance is not increased, the demand for a new title
policy (at the mortgagor’s expense, of course) seems entirely
unwarranted. The cost to the mortgagor is far from trivial and will
usually exceed $1000 for a residential refinancing.156
SERIES 321, 330 (2004). Citibank charges $650. See https://www.citimortgage.com/
ServicingWebStatic/faq/faq_payoff.jsp#Payoff7 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). The fee is
ostensibly to cover the original lender’s costs in preparing and delivering the CEM Agreement,
but it seems fairly obvious that this explanation is a sham. The lender, after all, has an
obligation to discharge the mortgage of record unless a CEM Agreement is requested, and
there is no reason to suppose that executing and delivering the CEM costs the lender more
than executing and recording the discharge. The fee is charged simply because lenders know
the mortgagor’s only alternative to obtaining the CEM is to pay the mortgage recording tax
on the amount of the new loan. In light of the fact that the tax can cost many thousands of
dollars, lenders have more than ample leverage to exact a fee of hundreds of dollars for the
CEM Agreement. According to the National Association of Realtors, the median sale price of a
residential unit in the New York City/northern New Jersey metropolitan area in 2004 was
$385,900.
See
http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/files/REL05Q4T.pdf/$FILE/
REL05Q4T.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). If an average mortgage of 80% of value, or about
$320,000, is assumed, the mortgage tax (at 2% minus $25) would be $6375. It is easy to see
why property owners who refinance would prefer to pay the old lender’s fee for the CEM
Agreement.
155. For example, the American Land Title Association’s 1992 Loan Policy, available at
http://www.alta.org/forms/loan.doc (last visited Jan. 21, 2006), defines “insured” to include
“the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage and each successor in
ownership of the indebtedness.” Id. at Conditions and Stipulations 1(a)(i).
The intent of the first definition of “insured” in the ALTA loan policies is to insure
the mortgage lien both while the loan is held by the original lender and when the
loan is sold to an assignee in the secondary mortgage market. Such assignee does
not have to be named as an insured in the policy’s Schedule A or added by a
subsequent endorsement.
JOYCE PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 4.9 (Release 3, 2005) (footnote omitted).
156. For a refinanced mortgage of $320,000, a typical amount as estimated in supra note
159. In the Bronx or Queens, the premium rate for a mortgagee’s title insurance policy would
be $344 for the first $35,000 of coverage plus $3.64 per $1,000 of additional coverage, or a
total premium of $1381. These rates are provided by the New York Title Insurance Rate
Service and are found at http://www.nytitle.com/contact.ivnu (last visited Dec. 17, 2005).
A discounted “reissue rate” is available in some circumstances. The New York Title
Insurance Rate Service website states,
A Refinance or Subordinate Mortgage Policy issued within ten years of a previously
insured Mortgage or fee interest where the premises are identical, there has been no
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In an effort to discover why new title insurance is thought
necessary when a mortgage is assigned for refinancing in New York,
we secured the assistance of a prominent New York City real estate
practitioner in raising the question with a group of about 125 other
real estate lawyers who belong to an email Listserv.157 We found the
answers to be underwhelming.158 On the whole, we were left with
change of ownership, and the amount is less than $250,000 shall be charged 50% of
the Mortgage Rate on the liability up to the amount of the existing indebtedness
and 100% of the Mortgage Rate on any liability in excess of the existing
indebtedness.
Id.; see also James M. Orphanides & S.H. Spencer Compton, New Advances and Tools for
Lenders and Counsel in Title Insurance, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE FINANCING 2004: WHAT BORROWERS & LENDERS NEED TO KNOW NOW 545, 555
(2004).
It is entirely possible that the mortgagor will not be informed of the reissue rate and will
pay the full rate despite the theoretical availability of the discount. See In re Coordinated Title
Ins. Cases, 2004 WL 690380, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2004) (certifying a class action
against eight New York title insurance companies charging them with fraud and deceptive
business conduct for failing to advise mortgagors of the reissue rate); Kenneth R. Harney, Title
Insurance “Reissue Rates” Spark Class Action Suits, Controversy, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003,
available at http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/20030414_reissuerates.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2006).
157. The attorney who assisted us was Joshua Stein of the New York City office of
Latham and Watkins. We are grateful for his help.
158. The basic answers were as follows:
1. The new title insurance has the advantage of insuring the validity of the assignment
itself—something that the original title insurance obviously cannot do. This is correct, but it is
difficult to give it any serious weight. An assignment of a mortgage is, as between the parties,
largely an unnecessary document. Anyone who acquires the right to enforce the debt will
automatically be regarded as having the right to enforce the mortgage as well. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4(a) (1997) (“A transfer of an obligation
secured by a mortgage also transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree
otherwise.”); see also Johnson v. Hart, 3 Johns. Cas. 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803). Hence, if the
assignee acquires the promissory note, the risk of the mortgage assignment’s being held invalid
is so remote as to be trivial.
2. If the original mortgagor and mortgagee had modified the mortgage’s terms before
making the assignment, the assignee might be subject to a risk of partial loss of priority. Once
again, the observation is correct, but the problem seems extremely minor and easy to manage.
If the lender who takes the assignment is unaware of the modification and merely inspects the
original mortgage and note, there is no risk at all, since under applicable law, it is precisely the
terms of those documents that will continue to have full priority over any intervening liens. If
the lender who accepts the assignment is relying on the modified terms of the mortgage, it can
only be because that lender is fully aware of the modification. In that (relatively rare) case, if
the modification was not within the scope of any future advance clause, the assignee may well
wish to obtain a new title insurance policy—in effect, to ensure that there are no intervening
interests to whose holders priority might be lost.
3. Mortgagee title insurance policies routinely exclude coverage for title defects
“created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured” and for matters “not known to the
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the impression that although the advantages of new title insurance
were marginal at best, lenders and their counsel saw little reason to
change the present practice because the cost of the new title
insurance could so easily be passed on to borrowers.
The industry’s attitude is disheartening but perhaps unsurprising.
We are dealing with traditional practices that are not readily
susceptible to change through “jawboning.” The only likely
motivator of change will be an altered understanding of the
competitive forces of the market on the part of refinancing lenders.
We believe that such a change may well occur,159 but until it does,
we do not think it fruitful to recommend or argue for adoption of a
widespread national practice of making written mortgage
assignments a part of residential refinancings. Doing so would entail
major changes in the flow of documents in areas of the nation
outside New York, would require retraining of personnel, and would
inevitably involve significant startup costs. Moreover, for the change
in practice to be effective, it would require adoption by a large
number of lenders. There is no existing entity with the overarching
authority necessary to require or even encourage such a change.
Without question, some lenders would resist change on grounds of a
short-term cost increase. Despite its theoretical advantages over
subrogation, we have reluctantly discarded assignment. Subrogation,

Company, not recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, but known to the insured
claimant and not disclosed in writing to the Company.” AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASS’N, 1992
LOAN POLICY, EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 3, available at http://www.alta.org/forms/
loan.doc (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). If the original mortgagee knew of, or agreed to, a title
defect, would that knowledge or agreement be imputed to an assignee of the mortgage so as to
bar it from recovering on the policy for that title defect? Superficially this appears to be a
legitimate concern of the refinancing lender, but almost certainly it is not. The reason is that
knowledge or act of the original insured cannot properly be imputed to the assignee. See S.
Title Ins. Co. v. Crow, 278 So. 2d 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), in which the court
immediately saw through this sort of defense by the title insurer. It held:
[The policy] excludes defects “known to the insured Claimant.” Appellant reads this
as if it said “named insured,” and that is the fallacy in its argument. There is no
claim that either of the “insured claimants” knew of the defect, and while the
defense might be good against the original insured, it is not available against the
[assignees], who took without notice of the defective title.
Id. at 295. But see Countrywide Homes, Inc. v. Lafonte, No. 14265/01, 2003 WL 1389089
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 13, 2003) (An unreported New York case taking the contrary view—
imputing the original mortgagee’s knowledge of a mortgage defect to the assignee. This
holding and result seem plainly wrong.).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 186–195 (describing the increasing
competitiveness in the residential mortgage market).
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by contrast, imposes no added costs on lenders and requires no
changes in the flow of paperwork, and the broad Restatement view
of subrogation is already well on its way to becoming the
predominant view nationally.
VII. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE RESTATEMENT APPROACH
We have argued above that a liberal view of mortgage
subrogation would result in a major reduction in the cost of title
proof in refinancing transactions.160 In this Part, we consider who
will benefit from that reduction. There are several possibilities. The
title insurance industry might become more profitable as a major
cost of doing business is eliminated. On the other hand, the rule
might inure to the benefit of homeowners in the form of lower title
insurance premiums as title insurers are forced by competitive
pressures to pass their savings on in the form of lowered premiums.
Alternatively, mortgage lenders might decide to become self-insurers
of title in the refinancing context, dropping the requirement for title
insurance altogether, with an accompanying cost saving for
homeowners.
To gain a better perspective on these important questions, we
conducted conversations with a variety of executives representing
major title insurance companies and mortgage lenders from all
geographic areas of the country.161 They were extremely helpful and
forthcoming with their insights. In part, this was because they were
assured that their comments would not be quoted with personal
attribution. Their comments were unanimous in one important
respect—they supported either judicial or legislative adoption of the
Restatement subrogation rule. This is hardly surprising, since the
rule dramatically reduces the financial risk to lenders and title
insurers posed by intervening lienors in the refinancing context.
However, when the focus turned to whether the uniform
adoption of the Restatement approach would yield significant savings
to homeowners in the form of lower title insurance premiums, there
160. See supra text accompanying notes 123–139.
161. Ten individuals were interviewed during the summer and fall of 2004. They were
selected on the basis of the authors’ personal acquaintance with them or with others who could
provide introductions to them. No claim is made that they represent the mortgage and title
industries as a whole, but all were highly knowledgeable and familiar with industry conditions
in their areas of the nation. Because they were being asked questions whose answers could
potentially be highly useful to their competitors, all were promised anonymity.
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was far less unanimity. A large minority of our contacts believed that
the national adoption of the Restatement approach would bring
substantial and relatively immediate consumer savings. Others,
making up a slight majority, were much more guarded in their
responses. Some in this latter category foresaw small, incremental
savings to consumers while others predicted virtually no short-term
change in refinancing title insurance rates and relatively modest longterm reductions.
While we initially found these responses somewhat perplexing,
our discussions revealed several important considerations that may
account for much of the disparity of views. Several respondents who
foresaw little impact on consumer costs emphasized governmental
regulation of title insurance premium rates. The degree of state
regulation varies widely from state to state. A few states have virtually
no rate regulation.162 Many other states follow a “file and use”
approach; in these jurisdictions, title insurers file their rate schedules
with the appropriate state agency and they become effective within
fifteen to thirty days.163 Others are categorized as “file and use and
justify”; these states impose an additional requirement on insurers to
“justify” their rates.164 While in some of these latter two types of
jurisdictions, the insurer’s rate decision is virtually incontestable, in
others, the state agency may sometimes challenge a proposed rate
change. More extensive regulatory restrictions are found in “file for
approval” states. In such states, the regulatory agency must review
rate filings to determine that they do not violate state substantive
restrictions.165 Finally, a few states are classified as “regulatory rate-

162. Our research reveals that seven states have no rate regulation of title insurance
premiums. These states include Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma,
and West Virginia. In addition, Iowa does not permit the writing of title insurance within the
state.
163. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-25-6 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-376 (2002);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-11-118 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.22-020 (2001); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.2406, 500.7312 (West 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 692A.120(3)
(2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-35-111 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-19A-209 (2005);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.29.140 (West 1999).
164. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.66.370, 21.66.380 (2004); CAL. INS. CODE §§
12401.1, 12401.2 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:46B-42, 17:46B-43 (West 1994); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-40-30 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3935.04 (West 2002); 40 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 910-37, 910-38 (West 1999).
165. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-419 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE § 41-2706
(2003); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 22-101 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-75-980 (2002);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-23-326 (2005).
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setting”; a state regulatory agency sets title insurance rates in these
jurisdictions.166
To the extent that states either mandate or heavily regulate title
insurance rates, the market is likely to be slower to react to riskreducing legal changes than in states where title underwriters are
relatively free to set rates. Two of our contacts indicated that it
would take “years” to see premium reductions in heavily regulated
states. On the other hand, where states allow title insurers greater
flexibility in rate-setting, competition among title insurers is much
more likely to put more immediate downward pressure on rates.
Some of the pessimism about the rate-reduction potential of the
Restatement rules is attributable to the fact that several of our
contacts were from states having heavy regulation.
However, this pessimism may be overstated. If competitive
pressures force title insurers to lower refinancing premiums in states
with low regulation, it seems unlikely that rates will lag inordinately
in heavy regulation jurisdictions. This is because both title insurance
underwriters and major mortgage lenders are national in their
operations. For example, assume that a major lender like Bank of
America obtains a substantial reduction in refinancing title insurance
rates in California (where there is great flexibility for the industry to
make rate reductions). The bank is unlikely to permit those rates to
continue indefinitely higher in Florida, where the regulatory regime
normally makes rates much harder to change. We suspect that a title
insurer that wants to keep Bank of America’s business on a national
basis will be under significant pressure to file promptly for a rate
reduction in Florida and to pursue the matter vigorously with that
state’s regulators. Moreover, if the title insurer that applies for the
rate reduction can show that its risk has been significantly reduced by
modernization of the subrogation doctrine, the regulators should
have a significant incentive to endorse the rate reduction.
Another factor that some of our contacts believed would restrict
the potential for a significant reduction in title insurance rates was
the fact that industry claims losses167 are a relatively small percentage
of total premiums collected. For example, these percentages were
166. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.782 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-30-6 (LexisNexis
2004); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9.07 (Vernon 1981).
167. The term “losses” includes loss-adjustment expense, which refers to attorneys fees,
court costs, investigation expenses, and other costs associated with payment and settlement of
claims.
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5.3%, 4.8%, 4.6%, 4.0%, and 4.5% for the years 2000–2004
respectively.168 The argument is that if overall claims paid are
relatively low, a change in mortgage subrogation law to better
protect refinancing lenders and their insurers can have, at most, only
a modest impact on title insurance rates.
There is a good reason why these percentages are so low as
compared, for example, with the property/casualty insurance
industry, where the analogous ratio of claims paid to premiums
collected averaged 80.4% for most of the same period.169 The reason
is that a great deal of the money charged for title insurance goes into
risk reduction rather than claims payment. As one analyst has noted:
Title insurers sell protection against losses caused by problems
with title . . . arising out of events that occurred before the effective
date of the policy. Because most uncertainty about the past can be
reduced by careful research, a title insurer can exert a great deal of
control over the risks it underwrites.
....
Consequently, title insurers operate by collecting premiums,
much of which are used to cover the underwriting costs associated
with the issuance of a title insurance policy. Therefore, in contrast
to property and casualty insurers, title insurers expend premium
dollars before collection and therefore do not retain most of the
premium dollar before it is expended in the ordinary course of
business.170

Stated another way, title insurers have relatively low claims payouts
because they expend large amounts on personnel and infrastructure
costs before losses occur.
However, significant reductions in premiums should result from
our proposed change in the law because its implementation should
168. Gary A. Davis & Richard McCarthy, Title Industry Running on All Cylinders, A.M.
BEST SPECIAL REPORT, October 4, 2004, at 9 (covering 2000–2003 reporting years),
available at http://www.alta.org/industry/AMBest04.pdf; see also American Land Title
Association, Annual Statement for the year 2004 of the American Land Title Association
Industry, at 3, available at http://www.alta.org/industry/TitleInsurInd04.pdf (covering
2004 reporting year); see also Demotech, Inc., Title Insurance Industry Information &
Economic Data 2003 Year in Review: Solving Tomorrow’s Insurance Challenges Today, June
2004, http://www.demotech.com/pdf/PTIC/2003_Year_in_Review.pdf.
169. Davis & McCarthy, supra note 168, at 9.
170. Id. at 8–9.
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permit a substantial reduction in both the title insurance industry’s
underwriting costs and its loss payouts.171 Under our proposal, where
the refinancing loan does not involve an increased principal amount,
or the increased principal is covered by a future advances clause, the
risk of losing priority to intervening interests is virtually eliminated.
Consequently, if the same title company that wrote the original loan
policy writes the refinance insurance, it may no longer be necessary
for the title company to conduct any new title search whatever.
Moreover, even where the refinancing involves “cash out” to the
borrower, the title company’s search may be more cursory and the
need for close evaluation of the results less compelling. As we
stressed earlier, lenders require title insurance in refinancing
transactions largely because of a concern that intervening liens and
similar interests will trump their new mortgages.172 The title industry
itself emphasizes this as the most important risk.173 If the law is
changed so that a refinancing lender is subrogated in every instance
up to the amount of the mortgage that it replaces, then the most
important component of title risk in the typical refinancing
transaction will have been obviated.174 Of course, the Restatement
approach will not protect the lender to the extent that the refinanced
debt is increased unless that increase is within the scope of a future
advances clause.175 However, as we explained earlier, the typical
171. One can think of underwriting expenses as falling into two major categories:
maintenance of a “title plant” (a set of records reflecting all recorded transactions) and the
personnel cost involved in searching in the plant. Subrogation will not affect the first of these
expenses, but it should result in a major curtailment of the second, as searches for intervening
liens become unnecessary in refinancing transactions.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
173. In response to the question why a homeowner must pay for a refinancing lender’s
title policy, the American Land Title Association responds:
Even if you recently purchased or refinanced your home, there are some problems
that could arise with the title. For instance, you might have incurred a mechanics
lien from a contractor who claims he/she has not been paid. Or you might have a
judgment placed on your house due to unpaid taxes, homeowner dues, or child
support for instance. The lender needs reassurance that the title to the property they
are financing is clear.
American Land Title Association, Questions About Title Insurance, http://www.alta.org/
consumer/questions.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
174. Title insurance also protects the refinancing lender against other relatively minor
risks; for example, that one of the borrower’s signatures on the new mortgage was forged. In
addition, the cost of the title policy may include loan closing services to the lender. See supra
text accompanying notes 122–148.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 92–107.
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“cash out” amount is relatively small compared to the average
homeowner’s equity and generally results in a very low-risk loan-tovalue ratio.176 Even without a future advances clause, lenders may
also consider the risk of loss of priority for the additionally-financed
amount without an additional title examination to be insubstantial.
Such a significant legal change would not go unnoticed by the
lending industry. Large institutional lenders are sophisticated
consumers, and they will realize that one of the title insurer’s major
risks has been eliminated. Even now, with the protection afforded by
the law of subrogation far from uniform, lenders doubtless are aware
that title insurance underwriting efforts are less intense in refinances
than in the context of a home purchase-money mortgage. The title
insurance industry concedes that this is so:
In underwriting refinance transactions, the title insurer or its
agent performs a more limited title search than is necessary for a
resale transaction. This less comprehensive title search occurs
because only the position of the lender of the refinanced mortgage
has to be determined to assure the lender of its priority.177

Lenders compete constantly for loan customers, and they are
highly sensitive to the costs they impose on those customers. Once
the lending industry realizes that the risk to the title insurance
industry in insuring refinancings is largely obviated by modernization
of the subrogation doctrine, it is likely to put substantial market
pressure on title insurers to lower their premiums substantially. This
pressure on title insurance companies will come in an economic
environment that already is highly competitive. While refinancing
premiums have been important to the overall economic health of the
title insurance industry,178 it is now under serious pressure to reduce
176. See supra text accompanying notes 56–60.
177. Davis & McCarthy, supra note 168, at 11.
178. Refinancing premiums as a percentage of total title insurance premium revenues vary
substantially depending on whether mortgage interest rates are falling or rising. In periods of
sharply declining rates, refinancings increase substantially and total premiums rise, often
dramatically. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. Refinanced mortgages averaged
60% of all one-to-four-family mortgage originations for the period 2001–2003. See Mortgage
Bankers
Association,
1-to-4
Family
Mortgage
Originations
1990–2003,
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/marketdata/data/03/1-4_originations.html (last visited
Jan. 28, 2006). The converse is true when interest rates are rising. The refinancing share of
premium revenues has generally varied from a low of 20% to a high of 60% over the past several
years. As of this writing, our information indicates that 40–50% of premium income is
attributable to refinancing. See E-mail from Denise Warren, Director of Investor Relations,
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those premiums, which are already substantially lower than for new
purchase mortgages.179 Major institutional lenders continue to
negotiate significantly lower bulk rate premium packages, and some
major title insurers are already planning further major reductions.180
In the final analysis, the title insurance industry can endure a
significant reduction in refinance premiums. The past several years
have been highly profitable for the industry. As one leading analyst
of the industry summarized, “[t]he title industry reported record
results in 2003 for the second consecutive year, as performance
continued to improve and it benefited from favorable economic
conditions. The industry’s strong revenue generation was due to
improved loss experience, enhanced operating efficiencies and the
continued booming housing market.”181 As the refinancing boom
comes to an end, the industry’s revenues will undoubtedly fall, and
the increasing availability of subrogation will force them to fall
First American Corporation, to Benjamin Gardner, Research Assistant to Professor Grant
Nelson (June 10, 2005) (on file with author) (estimating the current percentage to be 40%);
Telephone Interview by Benjamin Gardner with the Head Title Officer of a leading title
insurer (June 13, 2005) (notes in possession of author) (estimating the current percentage to
be 45–50%). The highest estimated percentage during the past decade was over 80%. Id.
179. The primary reason is the operation of so-called “reissue rates,” which in effect
represent discounts for issuance of a new title policy by a company that wrote a prior policy on
the same real estate within some fixed time period. See, e.g., First American Corporation, 2004
Annual report Issue: Management’s Discussion and Analysis, BUSINESS NOW: THE MAGAZINE
OF CORPORATE SUCCESS, at 17, available at http://www.firstam.com/faf/ir/pdf/annual-rpt04.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006); Stewart Information Services Corporation, Defining Our
Future, Building Our Business: 2004 Annual Report, Feb. 16, 2005, at 21, available at
http://www.stewart.com/docs/Stewart_04AR.pdf.
180. One major insurer has lowered those premiums 30% from an already discounted
base. See First American Does One-Rate, 29 NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS 8, Apr. 18, 2005, § 30.
One of our industry interviewees reported that a major title insurer had agreed to give a large
institutional lender a bulk rate of $275 for residential refinance policies that normally would
carry a $750 premium.
181. Davis & McCarthy, supra note 173, at 1. This analysis further explains:
Following record earnings generated in the previous year, the title industry reported
robust earnings in 2003 for the eighth consecutive year. The industry reported
pretax operating gains, including net investment income, of approximately $1.5
billion for 2003, which was a staggering 87% higher than 2002. This record
performance was driven by strong underwriting results, growth in operating revenue
and an increase in net investment income attributed to a mounting invested asset
base. Growth in operating revenue reflected a surge in demand for title products, as
lower interest rates fueled refinance activity and strong home sales. While total
operating revenue in 2003 exceeded the prior year’s record by 31%, the industry was
able to absorb this large influx of new business more efficiently, primarily due to
technological advancements.
Id.
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farther. However, subrogation will also reduce operating costs,
cushioning the revenue drop.
A major change is also occurring in the market for home
mortgages. For a number of years, lenders have granted home equity
loans while imposing only minor settlement costs, or none at all, on
consumer borrowers.182 Lenders simply internalized those costs,
reflecting them in the overall interest rate return. Now, for the first
time, lenders are seriously examining a similar approach to first
mortgage lending. This is a radical departure from past practice,
under which lenders making first mortgage loans imposed numerous
“junk fees” (in addition to the arguably legitimate cost of title
insurance, credit reports, and the few other fees required for actual
services from outside providers).183 The lending industry widely
understood that the “junk fee” approach was intended to confuse
consumers, make price comparisons among lenders difficult, and
frustrate the sort of vigorous shopping that the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act was designed to encourage.184
The new trend, however, seems to signify a recognition by home
mortgage lenders that confusing and frustrating their customers may,
in the long run, be poor business strategy. Instead, lenders are
beginning to roll all fees and charges into a single interest rate and a
single loan fee.185 Without doubt this will facilitate price competition
182. Kenneth R. Harney, No-Cost Equity-Style Loans Come to Primary Mortgages, WASH.
POST, May 6, 2005, at F01.
183. HUD defined “junk fees” as “any fee charged for a service to a borrower that has
little or no value in relation to the charge, and/or may be duplicative, to increase a loan
originator’s profits.” Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134, 49,136 n.6
(proposed July 29, 2002) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500).
184. It was precisely for this reason—the ineffectiveness of RESPA in making loan and
settlement costs “shoppable”—that HUD issued its Guaranteed Mortgage Package Agreement
proposal. See supra note 138. As HUD put it, “[A]n exemption should be provided for
packaging to facilitate earlier comparison shopping by borrowers, greater competition among
mortgage lenders and others, and guaranteed prices to borrowers from the time the borrower
applies for a mortgage through settlement.” Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 67 Fed.
Reg. 49,145 n.35. In effect, the proposal signified HUD’s admission that RESPA had failed.
See Kenneth A. Markison, HUD’s Proposal To Overhaul the Mortgage Process To Lower Costs and
Increase Homeownership, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 62, 63 (2002).
185. Beginning in May, 2005,
Bank of America [began] offering what it calls its ‘Mortgage Rewards’ plan, which
essentially brings its streamlined, zero-cost equity line program to people shopping
for primary mortgages to buy homes. Initially it will [sic] available in 20 states,
including Maryland and Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Mortgage industry
sources say other large, well-known banks are developing their own versions . . . .
Harney, supra note 182.
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simply because it is far easier for consumers to shop the market for a
single fee than for a multiplicity of complex fees.
This new approach to marketing by residential lenders is largely a
product of the growth in consumer use of the Internet. Because the
Internet makes the gathering of information significantly less costly
and more convenient than in the past,186 providers of a wide variety
of goods and services have become more competitive in terms of
price.187 In the primary mortgage market, a consumer who wishes to
gather information about the interest rates and loan fees of, say, ten
lenders can do so in a few minutes at the computer rather than
spending several hours on the telephone.188 Moreover, it has become
practical for consumers to consider lenders across the nation, rather
than only those with local offices.189 In these conditions, lenders who
frustrate and confuse their potential customers with lengthy lists of
186. The costs of storing, transmitting, and processing information have been dropping
continuously by 25 to 35% per year for the last 30 years, and that trend is expected to continue
for at least the next 5 to 10 years. See Till M. Guldimann, How Technology Is Reshaping Finance
and Risks, BUS. ECON., Jan. 2000, at 41, 44. As one analyst noted,
Consumers view financial products, including mortgages, to be commodities with
only the price differentiating product offerings. And many consumers have ready
access to price information via the Internet. Market research shows that consumers
are becoming impatient with firms that fail to provide convenience and access to
innovative products and that lack the ability to execute transactions quickly.
Forrest Pafenberg, The Single-Family Mortgage Industry in the Internet Era: Technology
Developments and Market Structure, at 28 (2004), http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/
technology paper12004.pdf (footnotes omitted).
187. “Today’s home mortgage market is highly securitized and competitive, bolstered by
government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Large mortgage lenders
have adopted high-volume, low-cost strategies based on highly automated systems, resulting in
strong price competition.” Jeffery W. Gunther & Robert R. Moore, Small Banks’ Competitors
ECON.,
Jan.–Feb.
2004,
available
at
Loom
Large,
SOUTHWEST
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2004/swe0401b.html.; see also Jane Bryant Quinn,
Cutting the Commissions, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 2005, at 47 (describing how the Internet has
made the market for residential real estate brokerage services more price competitive).
188. See Online Shopping for Mortgages, BANKRATE.COM, Mar. 15, 2004,
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/real-estate/buyerguide2004/online-mortgage.asp;
Broderick Perkins, Online Mortgage Shopping Today, REALTY TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004,
http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/20040123_webshop.htm. Online mortgage shopping sites
that access multiple lenders simultaneously include www.nextag.com, www.theloanpage.com,
www.finance.yahoo.com, www.lendingtree.com, and www.eloan.com. Many individual lenders
also provide on-line rate quotes and loan applications. See, e.g., http://www.flagstar.com/
lending/mortgage/refinance.
189. “The other favorable trend has been a transformation of the mortgage industry. To
get a loan twenty years ago, you usually went to a local bank or savings association, which
approved the application and provided the money. Now, the mortgage business is mostly
national.” Robert J. Samuelson, Is Housing a New Bubble?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 55.
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miscellaneous charges for the loan and ancillary services simply
cannot survive in the long run. All-inclusive loan quotes, in which
the consumer need only consider a single interest rate and a single
loan fee, will almost certainly predominate in the future. Thus far,
the new programs adopted by lenders have not included title
insurance, primarily because title insurance rates are regulated, and
therefore the lending industry cannot bargain them down as quickly
and effectively as other costs. But as we have suggested above,190 this
is surely a temporary limitation. If lenders cannot get title insurance
expenses down to acceptable levels, they are likely to dispense with
title insurance entirely, becoming self-insurers. The Restatement
approach to mortgage subrogation will make such decisions possible
by greatly reducing—indeed, virtually eliminating—the risks of selfinsurance.191
The requirements of the two federally sponsored secondary
mortgage market purchasers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,192
comprise a major element in the equation of residential refinancing.
These two congressionally chartered corporations purchase huge
numbers of residential mortgages from local lenders.193 They then
either hold the mortgages in their portfolios or securitize them.194
Most lenders want to preserve the option of selling their loans to
these two entities and, hence, comply with their guidelines in every
residential loan they make. At present, both Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac insist that a new title insurance policy be issued on every new
loan.195 Hence, lenders are quite unlikely to decide to self-insure title
190. See supra text accompanying notes 162–166.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 122–147 for a discussion of the remaining risks.
192. For a discussion of the vast scope of the influence of these two entities, see
Economist.com, Building the American dream . . . or Nightmare?, THE ECONOMIST GLOBAL
AGENDA, Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id
=3686475.
193. Together, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased 54% of the residential mortgages
originated in the United States in 2003 and 51% of those originated in 2002. Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight, Mortgage Markets and the Enterprises in 2003, Oct. 2004, at
12, http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/MME2003.pdf.
194. See Freddie Mac, Our Business, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/
what_we_do/business.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
195. See, e.g., Fannie Mae Selling Guide, Part V, Ch. 2, Title Insurance, Dec. 4, 1998,
http://www.allregs.com/efnma/ (“The lender must assure that title insurance that satisfies
our requirements is in place before a mortgage is delivered to us for purchase or securitization.
The title insurance policy must ensure full title protection to us.”); Fannie Mae, Refinancing
Costs Refinancing Requirements: & Costs, http://www.fanniemae.com/homebuyers/
findamortgage/refinancing/requirements.jhtml (last visited Jan. 30, 2006); Freddie Mac,
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to refinancing mortgages until Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac decide
to do so as well. However, a decision along these lines seems quite
feasible; indeed, there are a number of states in which the two
government-sponsored agencies could eliminate their title insurance
requirements for refinance mortgages today. As the Restatement
subrogation rule spreads to additional jurisdictions, the two
secondary market agencies could (and we believe, should)
accordingly make available an exemption from the title insurance
requirement.
In sum, we believe that adoption of the Restatement approach to
subrogation and related issues will greatly reduce, if not eliminate,
the title risk in mortgage refinancings and will create compelling
pressures on title insurance companies to respond with substantially
lower premiums. This change should enable the industry to achieve
major savings in underwriting costs. To be sure, the regulatory
regime for title insurance may retard competition in some parts of
the country. However, given the market strength of the major
institutional lenders and the growing price competition in both the
mortgage and the title insurance markets, it seems highly likely that
the proposed legal changes will dramatically benefit lenders and their
homeowner clientele. Should the title insurance industry resist
significant premium reduction, it will face a lending industry whose
members will be increasingly willing to self-insure.
VIII. CHANGING SUBROGATION LAW: IS THE SOLUTION
STATE OR FEDERAL?
This Article demonstrates that the pervasive adoption of the
Restatement approach to subrogation and related priority issues in
refinancing transactions is correct as a normative matter and likely to
lead to substantial savings for refinancing homeowners. We consider
here the optimal way to proceed in order to allow this adoption to
become reality. We are, of course, heartened that the recent trend of
case law has been favorable to the Restatement approach.196 The
continuation of that trend is desirable if homeowners are to receive
substantial savings when they refinance. However, state-by-state
judicial adoption of a Restatement rule can be a tedious and uneven
Review Checklist for Final Delivery Electronic Mortgage Documents, May 6, 2005,
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/multifamily/docs/specialproductschecklist.doc.
196. See supra note 39.
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process, likely to extend over many years. Even more problematic
would be an attempt by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws to promulgate the Restatement approach as
a uniform act. As we have noted elsewhere, uniform acts dealing with
real estate or mortgage law have been only rarely and sporadically
adopted by state legislatures.197
The future of the Restatement subrogation rule and related
doctrines may lie with Congress. It is a well-understood fact that the
residential mortgage market in the United States is a national
market, and that its efficiency is inevitably impaired to some extent
by varying state rules of law.198 It is for that reason that we recently
advocated the adoption by Congress of the Uniform Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Act, promulgated in 2002 by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.199 We concluded that the
national adoption of a uniform nonjudicial foreclosure procedure was
justified as a constitutional and policy matter, given “the enormous
impact of mortgage financing on the national economy and the
dramatic growth of the secondary market for mortgages. . . .”200
If anything, the proposal here is more modest. There we
advocated the congressional preemption of state foreclosure
procedure in those states that already utilize some version of
nonjudicial foreclosure, and the imposition of that type of
foreclosure remedy on the states—nearly half of the nation—where
only judicial foreclosure is currently permitted. This would
admittedly be a radical move, displacing a large body of state law in a
large number of states.

197. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1408–09, 1509 (2004); Ronald Benton
Brown, Whatever Happened to the Uniform Land Transactions Act?, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1017,
1017–18 (1996).
198. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home
Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 765, 787 (2005); Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market—A
Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L.J. 991, 996–97 (1986); James E.
McNulty, Secondary Mortgage Markets: Recent Trends and Research Results, FED. HOME LOAN
BANK BOARD J., Apr. 1984, at 10, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m6201/is_n3_17/ai_3209769. The national focus of the mortgage market is illustrated by
the extremely heavy involvement of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in acquiring home
mortgages. See supra note 193.
199. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 197, at 1509–13.
200. Id. at 1509.
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The proposal here is more analogous to congressional enactment
of the Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (the
“Garn Act”), which made mortgage due-on-sale clauses enforceable
as a matter of preemptive federal law.201 Prior to that enactment,
there was great uncertainty under many state statutes and judicial
decisions concerning the enforceability of “due-on-sale” provisions
in mortgages. Congress was motivated largely by desire to aid a
then-struggling savings and loan industry. In a sense, the
subrogation proposal presented here, like the Garn Act, deals with a
relatively narrow substantive rule rather than a wholesale change in
foreclosure practice. Like the Garn Act, this proposal, if enacted,
could very well save billions of dollars annually—but for refinancing
homeowners, not lenders.
Moreover, congressional enactment is entirely feasible from a
political standpoint. While the title insurance industry might oppose
the concept on the ground that it would sustain a loss of revenue in
refinancing transactions, the mortgage lending industry would have a
strong incentive to support it in order to reduce overall costs to
refinancing borrowers. It is quite realistic to expect Congress to act.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article advocates adoption of a package of proposals to
reform the law of mortgage refinancing with the Restatement’s
approach to the doctrine of subrogation as its centerpiece. We have
demonstrated that title insurance costs in residential mortgage
refinancings represent billions of dollars annually—costs that are now
borne overwhelmingly by homeowners. We have illustrated how
adoption of the Restatement sections dealing with subrogation and
related priority issues would virtually eliminate the risk of loss of
mortgage priority for refinancing lenders. We have also described
how two simple additions to mortgage documents would serve to
enhance this protection by strongly increasing the likelihood that
courts would apply the subrogation doctrine and would grant
priority to refinancing lenders even when the new mortgage exceeds
the amount of its predecessor. These latter steps could largely be

201. This mortgage clause authorizes a lender to accelerate the obligation and foreclose if
the real estate is transferred without the lender’s written permission. See Grant S. Nelson &
Dale A. Whitman, Congressional Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis of the
Garn-St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 251 (1983).
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accomplished by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac incorporating the
appropriate language in their standard residential mortgage forms.
We also considered the technique of direct assignment to new
lenders of mortgages being refinanced as an alternative to
subrogation, but concluded that the adoption of such an approach
would be impractical at this time.
Ultimately, the Restatement approach should be enacted by
Congress. Such federal legislation, buttressed by the two drafting
techniques described above, would represent a package of
protections for lenders that would largely obviate the major reason
for title insurance in refinancing transactions. In such an
environment, we believe that title insurers would either substantially
reduce premiums in home mortgage refinancings or run the risk that
major institutional lenders would eliminate the need for title
insurance completely by becoming self-insurers. Either way,
American homeowners would be the major beneficiaries.
The potential savings quite literally amount to billions of dollars.
Whether the change is accomplished by Congress or by the
incremental process of state adoption, it is vital that it occur before
the next major decline in mortgage interest rates and the
corresponding wave of mortgage financings. Economic efficiency in
the marketplace, and the attendant savings for individual households,
demands nothing less.

366

